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C O V E R  I M A G E
Jefferson Barracks sat on a bluff overlooking the Mississippi River, and looked like this by the time of the Civil War.  For 
more on the role of Jefferson Barracks in creating the US Calvary, see Daniel Gonzales, “Courageous and Faithful: The 
Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, 1833-1898.”
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C O N T E N T S
4  “Courageous and Faithful: The Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, 1833– 
  1898”
  By Daniel Gonzales
Daniel Gonzales examines the U.S. Calvary and its origins at Jefferson 
Barracks, and suggests that its location and work in the nineteenth 
century placed it at the center of westward expansion.
16  “The Missouri Conservation Commision: Part I: The Need For It and  
  the Constitutional Amendment That Established It”
  By Quinta Scott
In this first of two lavishly illustrated articles, Quinta Scott traces the 
evolution of thinking in Missouri that led to the creation of the state 
Conservation Commission and the influence of Aldo Leopold and Nash 
Buckingham.
34  “Cahokia and the Trans-Appalachian West in the American 
  Revolution”
  By Andrew Cooperman
The Battle of Fort San Carlos in 1780 was of great importance in 
the Revolutionary War.  Andrew Cooperman argues that a force of 
Americans and Illinois French Creoles foiled British plans to sweep 
through the Mississippi Valley.
46  “Gateway Liberalism: Catholic and Jewish Responses to Racially  
  Transitioning Neighborhoods and Schools in St. Louis’ West End,  
  1945–1960”
  By Sarah Siegel
When St. Louis schools were desegregated starting with Catholic 
schools in 1947 and St. Louis public schools after the Brown v. Topeka 
Board of Education decision, not everyone supported the changes.  
Sarah Siegel compares the responses to desegregation by Catholics and 
Jews in the city’s west end.
67  When Sleepy Hollow Came to St. Louis”
As part of a broader expedition, writer Washington Irving—whose 
famous works include “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow” and “Rip 
van Winkle”—visited St. Louis in 1832.  He had lunch with explorer 
and former territorial governor William Clark and saw Black Hawk 
imprisoned at Jefferson Barracks.  Here is his account.
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An undertaking like The Confluence doesn’t happen without the help of 
many people, both within Lindenwood University and beyond. We owe 
particular thanks to President James Evans, Provost Jann Weitzel, and 
the Board of Directors at Lindenwood for supporting this venture. We’d 
like to take this opportunity to extend our gratitude to the following 
people, institutions, and companies for their contributions to this issue 
of The Confluence; we could not have done it without you.
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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
 This issue of  The Confluence is about turning points—those moments that represent a 
critical change.  In some cases, these are stories of capturing the moment when decisions 
and actions transformed the region, while others are harbingers of change; they are 
emblematic of broader changes nationally that played out in St. Louis.
 Three of these articles point to sweeping changes in the American West.  Andrew 
Cooperman details the activities of George Rogers Clark and others in the Illinois 
Country during the American War of Independence culminating with the Battle of Fort 
San Carlos in St. Louis, suggesting that the victory in this region precluded the British 
from holding the Mississippi River valley, possibly shaping political realities of the 
region after the war.  
 Two more focus on the role of St. Louis in America’s Manifest Destiny.  Daniel 
Gonzales describes the critical role of the cavalry at Jefferson Barracks as a key tool in 
American expansion into the western frontier between the Barracks’ founding and the end of the nineteenth century.  
Washington Irving’s account of his brief visit to St. Louis in 1832 points to this expansion as well.  He lunched with 
noted explorer and Indian Commissioner William Clark at his country home, and pointedly asked him about York, the 
slave Clark took with him to the Pacific as part of the Corps of Discovery. One cannot help but wonder what Clark 
thought, being challenged about the status of York while surrounded by slaves serving the meal and catering to his 
visitor’s needs.  It is, therefore, the only account we have of what Clark thought happened to this fellow explorer.  Irving 
also saw the defeated Black Hawk in prison at Jefferson Barracks, who had defiantly resisted American expansion 
onto Sauk and Fox land in northwestern Illinois.  Black Hawk was exhibited to visitors like a zoo animal while at the 
Barracks, then sent to Fortress Monroe and toured around eastern cities to convince him that resistance to American 
expansion was pointless.
 In the first of two articles, Quinta Scott examines the natural world of the region and birth of conservation in Missouri.  
This beautifully illustrated article traces the thinking behind efforts to see the natural world as something worthy of 
preservation and protection.
 Finally, Sarah Siegel’s compelling research focuses on a critical period in St. Louis history in the late 1940s and early 
1950s and the integration of schools.  She examines sources that have received scant attention on the integration of 
Catholic schools and, in the aftermath of the ruling in 1954, St. Louis Public Schools.  By focusing the latter on Jewish 
students and families at Soldan High School, she offers a unique comparative perspective on this key period.  Her paper 
is the recipient of the Tatom Award, which is given by the St. Louis Metropolitan Research Exchange for the best student 
paper on a St. Louis topic.
 These are compelling articles on timely topics.  We hope you enjoy them.
Jeffrey Smith, PhD
Editor
And lastly, Lindenwood is undergoing great change with both President James Evans retiring and Provost Jann Weitzel 
leaving to become president of Cottey College.  Both have been strong supporters of this publication, and I want to thank 
both for their support over the six years we’ve published The Confluence.  We all wish them both the best in their new 
endeavors; I know Jim will enjoy retirement, and that Jann will make a great contribution leading Cottey.
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COURAGEOUS
and Faithful
B Y  D A N I E L  G O N Z A L E S
Last Soldier of the Indian Wars at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)
T h e  C a v a l r y  a t  J e f f e r s o n  B a r r a c k s ,
1 8 3 3 – 1 8 9 8
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Courageous and Faithful: The Cavalry at 
Jefferson Barracks, 1833–1897
The United States Cavalry was born at Jefferson 
Barracks, and its purpose was to conquer the western 
frontier. The men who joined became the vanguard of 
manifest destiny and were witnesses as Native Americans 
made their final struggle to preserve their way of life. 
To understand how the western half of our nation came 
to be, and a proud and ancient civilization was lost, we 
must listen to the stories of those who served as United 
States mounted troops. The men who served combined the 
lessons of earlier dragoon and mounted ranger regiments 
with the leadership of strong infantry officers. They 
came from a variety of backgrounds. Members of the 
U.S. dragoons were noted as “young men of respectable 
families,” and some of the most influential military figures 
of the nineteenth century, like Robert E. Lee, Jefferson 
Davis, John Bell Hood, and Nathan Boone (son of Daniel 
Boone), were included in their ranks. Most enlisted men, 
however, came from more humble roots. They were 
immigrants looking to find a path to the American dream, 
ex-slaves who quickly discovered that “freedom” did not 
mean freedom to work and live as equals, and men for 
whom life had hit them hard and a dangerous job with low 
pay on the edge of the frontier was the best path forward. 
For a great number of these men, Jefferson Barracks was 
the beginning of the journey. It was the site of organization 
for the first unit of cavalry in the regular army, a mustering 
point for the first buffalo soldiers, and the cavalry recruit 
depot for the entire army during much of the Indian Wars. 
Finally, throughout the nineteenth century, it was Jefferson 
Barracks that stood at the heart of the network of forts that 
spanned the ever-growing American frontier.
The Birth of American Cavalry
While short-lived mounted units were used beginning 
in 1776, it wasn’t until 1833 that the first permanent unit 
of cavalry in the United States Army was established.  In 
the early nineteenth century, the United States Congress 
pursued policies based on the philosophy of manifest 
destiny, or the belief in the divine right of the United 
States to claim land as far west as California. The first unit 
of permanent cavalry, the United States Dragoons, was 
established to help accomplish that end. 
In the years that followed, Jefferson Barracks was 
selected as the site of organization for these early units 
of mounted troops.1  The site was chosen, as Dragoon 
Colonel Philip St. George Cooke explained, because it 
was a central location for the units to be organized “after 
a uniform system, before it was to be thrown into actual 
service, operating in detached bodies among widely 
scattered tribes of Indians.”2  The task assigned to these 
early cavalrymen was monstrous. They numbered in the 
hundreds, but were given the mission of patrolling a 1,000 
mile frontier from Texas to Minnesota populated with 
almost 200,000 native people and ever increasing numbers 
Jefferson Barracks, c. 1841, from John Casper Wild, Valley of the Mississippi. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)
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of white settlers.3 In the 1830s and 40s the contributions 
of the mounted troops in Oregon, California, Texas, and 
beyond would expand United States territory by over a 
third and serve as a guiding force for establishing law and 
order in that new territory.4 
The motivation to create the first unit of permanent 
cavalry came as caravans of traders began moving 
along the Santa Fe Trail. As they did, increasing conflict 
developed with native populations. The current military, 
made up of only infantry and artillery, proved inadequate 
to patrol the growing frontier. Calls began as early as 1824 
for Congress to act to protect United States citizens in 
the western territories. Many argued that the only way to 
do this was to authorize a mounted force. They remained 
unwilling, however, as concern over a standing army and 
the high cost of maintaining mounted troops remained. 
In 1832, a Sac and Fox warrior named Black Hawk led a 
band of warriors to reclaim land he felt was improperly 
taken from his people in Illinois. The ensuing conflict, 
known as the Black Hawk War, left Congress with no 
choice but to act, and in 1833, after a failed experiment 
with volunteer mounted rangers, it authorized the creation 
of the U.S. Dragoons. The unit began formation at 
Jefferson Barracks in August of 1833.5  Officers were 
drawn from the regular army and those who had served 
as mounted rangers.6  Recruits were drawn from around 
the country to avoid sectional alliances, and described as 
“athletic young men of decent character and breeding.”7  
Despite the picturesque location of Jefferson Barracks 
along a bluff above the Mississippi River, the dragoons 
were unhappy. Poor quarters and a lack of equipment made 
many question their decision to join the new unit. Adding 
to frustrations was the fact that many new recruits had 
been induced into joining with promises of fine uniforms, 
ranking commensurate with cadets at West Point, and no 
menial duties, none of which proved forthcoming.  These 
realities led to mass desertion and disorder. In order to 
keep the unit from falling apart, harsh penalties were 
introduced. Deserters could lose their citizenship, receive 
50 lashes, or serve out the rest of their enlistment without 
pay.8  
This painting was made from a sketch done at Jefferson Barracks in 1832. In that year, Black Hawk and five other Sac and 
Fox leaders were imprisoned at the post. He was escorted to Jefferson Barracks by Lieutenant Jefferson Davis. While here, 
they were visited by author Washington Irving, who described them as “a forlorn crew, emaciated and dejected.” (Image: 
National Gallery of Art)
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Ultimately, the unit came together, and by 1837 the 
Commander of the Western Department of the Army, 
General Edmund Gaines, found them to be “in a state of 
police and discipline reflecting the highest credit.”9  In the 
years following the unit’s organization, they patrolled the 
western frontier. Their “pomp and precision” intimidated 
native tribes, allowing them to defend the west without a 
single battle with Native Americans until 1846.10  
With the outbreak of the bloodiest Indian War in United 
States history, the Seminole War in Florida, and with the 
U.S. Dragoons fully occupied in the West, a new regiment 
designated the 2nd Dragoons was created. Authorized 
by Congress on May 23, 1836, it was led by Colonel 
David Emanuel Twiggs and Lieutenant Colonel William 
Selby Harney.  The regiment’s first five companies were 
sent directly into conflict in Florida. The second half of 
the unit reported to Jefferson Barracks for organization 
and training.11 2nd Lieutenant William Gilpin described 
Jefferson Barracks when he arrived as “the most beautiful 
and pleasant Army station in the West.”12  In October of 
1837, the 2nd Dragoons left Jefferson Barracks and rode 
1,200 miles to the heart of the conflict where the training 
of this new unit would be put to the test.13 
Almost two decades later, in 1855, the 2nd Cavalry 
Regiment would be organized at Jefferson Barracks,  
dubbed “Jeff Davis’s Pets” because of the close 
supervision Secretary of War Jefferson Davis gave the 
unit.  The unit’s leadership included some of the finest 
officers of the time including Robert E. Lee and Albert 
Sydney Johnston. Training of the unit went smoothly until 
September of 1855 when an outbreak of cholera struck. 
Some 22 troopers died and over 400 deserted in fear. 
Miraculously, the unit was able to regroup, departing the 
base the following month. 
Created to manage the massively expanded frontier 
following the Mexican War, they spend the years leading 
up to the Civil War protecting the southern border of Texas 
from Comanche and Kiowa warriors, who had proven 
elusive as they were able to cross the border into Mexico 
to avoid pursuit. When the Civil War broke out, the unit 
like the nation, was divided. Officers served on both sides, 
but a majority joined Jefferson Davis in the Confederacy. 
Sixteen of the officers of the unit became generals during 
the Civil War, more than any unit before or since has 
produced in such a short period.14   
The 1st, 2nd, and the short-lived 3rd Dragoons served during the Mexican-American War between 1846 and 1848. This 
image depicts the second major battle of that war at Resaca De La Palma, a dried-out river bed filled with dense trees. At 
that battle, the 2nd Dragoons, led by Captain Charles A. May, led a botched charge against Mexican artillery. The unit was 
redeemed when it was discovered that in the process they had captured the commander of the enemy line, General Rómolo 
Diaz de la Vega. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)
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Fighting in the West
In the middle of the nineteenth century, migration west 
increased dramatically as transportation options expanded 
with the discovery of gold and other minable resources.15 
This migration caused an increase in violence between 
settlers and native tribes living on the plains. The violence 
reached a fever pitch during the Civil War, as the regular 
army largely abandoned the frontier.  In the decades that 
followed that bloody conflict, the regular army struggled 
to quell the unrest caused by a civilization aware that it 
 Colonel Henry Dodge served as the first commander 
of the U.S. Dragoons. It was Lieutenant Colonel Stephen 
Watts Kearny, however, who led instruction and training 
of the new unit. Kearny took command as colonel in 
1837 when Dodge retired to take on the governorship of 
Wisconsin Territory.  Kearny was described as “at all times 
courteous, bland, approachable, and just, yet stern, fixed 
and unwavering when his decisions were once formed.” 
Kearny was a skilled and experienced instructor. In fact, 
while instructing troops at Jefferson Barracks he was thrown 
from his horse unfazed.  He quickly instructed his troops 
“obstacle—march” and the line passed around him like 
water.
 Kearny was promoted to general during the Mexican 
American War and led the Army of the West in California. 
After contracting malaria in Vera Cruz, General Kearny 
returned to St. Louis where he died in 1848, just days 
after the birth of his son, Stephen. (Image: Missouri History 
Museum)
1st Dragoon Regiment dress uniform, 1833. (Image: St. 
Louis County Parks)
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was facing a fight for survival.16  Between 1866 and 1890, 
there were over 400 individual fights between Native 
American warriors and U.S. troops. Collectively, these 
battles, skirmishes, and actions have been dubbed the 
Indian Wars.17  They included fights with the Comanche 
in Texas, the Apache in New Mexico, the Sioux in 
Montana, and numerous other conflicts. Throughout this 
tumultuous period, the U.S. Army struggled to adapt to 
Native Americans’ unique and effective style of combat, 
while also struggling against their own shortcomings in 
manpower and training.18
Ultimately, the continuous flood of settlers combined 
with the Army’s constant pursuit to drive Native 
Americans onto reservations and pacify the West. Serving 
in a chief role during this struggle were the recruits 
trained in St. Louis and at Jefferson Barracks. St. Louis 
became the principal Cavalry Recruit Depot for the entire 
United States Army in 1870.19  Then in 1878, the depot 
was transferred to Jefferson Barracks. Troops who came 
Robert E. Lee, pictured here in his cavalry uniform, had 
served at Jefferson Barracks earlier in his career as a 
lieutenant with the Corps of Engineers in 1837. He 
described it then as the “dirtiest place I was ever in.” It is 
unclear if his opinion of the region had changed when he 
returned as lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Cavalry, but given 
the small number of commissions available in that period he 
likely saw it as his only opportunity for promotion. (Image: 
St. Louis County Parks)
Jefferson Barracks, 1883. This view of Jefferson Barracks shows much of what the post looked like while it served as the 
Cavalry Recruit Depot. It is a steel engraving originally published in the History of St. Louis City and County by J. Thomas 
Scharf. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)
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through the recruit depot to receive initial training and 
supplies were distributed widely to every cavalry unit in 
operation across the American West.20  The number of 
troops who left Jefferson Barracks each year fluctuated, 
but they averaged around 1,500 men.21   
Recruits at Jefferson Barracks were assigned to one 
of four companies of instruction. Each company shared 
a barracks, which left the recruit completely without 
privacy. Upon arrival they would be issued uniforms and 
some supplies. Much of the recruit’s necessities had to be 
purchased with his first month’s pay, which was a paltry 
$7 a month, half of their normal pay. With the money left 
over, some would visit local bars or bawdy houses, but 
others would use it to buy decent food at local groceries 
or restaurants, as the mess service at the depot was 
notoriously bad, consisting of salt pork, fried mush, and 
black coffee.22  While many aspects of service at the recruit 
depot could be unpleasant, one recruit explained that “to 
many of us enlistment was the best break in our lives. We 
learned to walk gracefully across…the parade field…head 
up, chest out, stomach in, arms close to the body, and not 
swinging like pump handles.”23 
The staff of the recruit depot was made up of officers 
from each active regiment, veteran non-commissioned 
officers, and a few re-enlisting privates. In the early 
years staff did little training of recruits, who would stay 
at the depot for just a few days or a month at the longest. 
Instead, they would assign them to basic barracks duty 
and task them with learning army discipline. The need for 
recruits to be better prepared for service led to changes at 
Jefferson Barracks in the 1880s, and a new program was 
instituted where recruits would spend four months at the 
base learning riding skills, the use of weapons, and basic 
military doctrine. Frederick C. Kurtz, who enlisted in 1883 
and served with the 8th Cavalry, described the training, 
saying “[we] went through the usual recruiting service of 
setting-up exercise [calisthenics], manual of arms, and 
bareback riding around a bull ring conducted by that cock-
eyed drill sergeant you all perhaps remember, who used 
not very polite language whenever one of us accidentally 
fell off the horse or dropped a gun while drilling.”24  
Once training of the recruits was complete, officers on 
detached duty at Jefferson Barracks would then escort 
troops in groups of as few as a dozen to as many as several 
hundred out to their regular posts across the West.25    
Jefferson Barracks played an important role in the 
history of racial relations in the U.S. Army in this period. 
In 1866, the peacetime expansion of the military, which 
was necessary to address southern Reconstruction and 
westward expansion, resulted in the creation of the first 
African American units in the regular U.S. Army. Two of 
these were cavalry regiments.26 With an initial pay of $13 
a month, military service, while dangerous and difficult, 
was one of the best breaks available to newly freed African 
Americans, who found that freedom did not mean equal 
opportunity.27 
Recruits Leaving Jefferson Barracks Cavalry Recruit Depot, 
January–December 1886. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)
Stables at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. (Image: Missouri 
History Museum)
U.S. Army Barracks at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. (Image: 
St. Louis County Parks)
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Nicknamed “Buffalo Soldiers” by the Cheyenne and 
Comanche Indians, these African American regular 
troops served with distinction across the western frontier. 
Throughout most of the rest of the nineteenth century, 
they maintained the highest rates of re-enlistment and the 
lowest rates of desertion in the United States Army.28 
While official organization was done elsewhere, both 
units of African American cavalry would have early ties 
to Jefferson Barracks. The 9th Cavalry Regiment would 
make its headquarters in 1870, and the 10th’s first recruits 
would join at the post in 1866. Beginning in 1878 all 
new recruits for both units would pass through Jefferson 
Barracks before joining their permanent regiments.29   
African American troops would make up 20 percent of 
the regular army during the Indian Wars, and they would 
serve in vital conflicts from the capture of Geronimo to the 
charge up San Juan Hill.30 
While serving with distinction, African American troops 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century faced deeply 
embedded racial prejudice, but the shortage of troops in 
the army during this period meant that discrimination in 
the form of withholding equipment or supplies was rare. 
Additionally, by the early 1880s, recruit units at Jefferson 
Barracks were integrated. Whites and blacks trained 
and lived side by side.  At many other posts around the 
country, troops of varying racial backgrounds served 
together as well, and for the most part interactions were 
peaceful. In January of 1888, however, racial tensions 
exploded at Jefferson Barracks in one of the most serious 
events of racial violence in the nation.31  Newspapers 
of the time called it “A Soldiers’ Riot.” Problems arose 
after an African American soldier was seen talking with a 
young white girl and was thrown in the guardhouse. This 
angered the other black troops, who then got in a fight with 
some white recruits. Things escalated into a large brawl 
involving knives, clubs, and rocks.32 In 1889, in reaction to 
these events, recruit units at Jefferson Barracks were re-
segregated. Company A and C became white, Company B 
became Irish, and Company D was designated for African 
Americans and other races. This condition remained until 
the Jefferson Barracks Cavalry Recruit Depot closed in 
1894.33  
The Dogs of War: Cavalry at the Turn of the 
Century
As the nineteenth century came to an end, so did the 
violent struggle between the United States and native 
tribes for which the U.S. Cavalry had been created.34  At 
Jefferson Barracks, the end of this era brought a real crisis. 
The barracks buildings were in a state of disrepair from 
the constant flow of recruits. Poor conditions meant high 
levels of disease. Finally, the presence of both meant that 
desertion reached disastrous levels. The calls for change 
reached a fever pitch.35  
In 1887, the Surgeon General of the U.S. Army declared 
Jefferson Barracks “the most un-healthy military post in 
the country.”36   As the decade went on, local newspapers 
reported on murders, suicides, desertions, and epidemics.37  
All of this made St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter Frank 
Woodward curious. What was really happening at the 
old barracks? In 1889, he launched an investigation by 
enlisting in the U.S. Cavalry. He spent almost two months 
at the Recruit Depot before deserting and beginning a 
series of articles on life at Jefferson Barracks. These 
exposés would shock the nation with accusations of 
embezzlement, abuse, false imprisonment, and even 
murder. In reaction, Secretary of War Redford Proctor 
ordered a full investigation, the results of which led to 
better conditions and pay for the entire army. Additionally, 
over the following years the barracks would be virtually 
rebuilt.38  
In 1894, the Cavalry Recruit Depot closed its doors. 
The 3rd Cavalry, which had begun its life at Jefferson 
Barracks in 1846 as the Regiment of Mounted Rifles, 
returned to take over.39  Commanded by Lieutenant George 
A. Purington, they would inherit an almost completely 
In January 1889, 2nd Lt. John J. Pershing, who would go on 
to lead the American Expeditionary Force in France during 
World War I, was at Jefferson Barracks preparing to lead 
a group of thirty new recruits to join the 6th Cavalry in Fort 
Wingate, New Mexico.  Pershing would gain the nickname 
“Blackjack” for his service with another unit of cavalry, the 
African American 10th Regiment. He would serve with them 
beginning in 1896, and lead them in the famous charge 
up San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War. (Image: 
Library of Congress)
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Color Lithograph of Jefferson Barracks by Gast Moeller and Company, c. 1866. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
4th Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, 1902. (Image: St. Louis 
County Parks)
Plan for proposed reconstruction at Jefferson Barracks, 
1891. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)
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new post. In the years that had passed from the 1889 
exposé that shed light on the poor conditions at Jefferson 
Barracks, new two story barracks, cavalry stables, officers’ 
quarters, and quartermaster quarters were all constructed. 
In 1892, a bandstand was completed.40  This would 
prove to be an important site during the tenure of the 3rd 
Cavalry as its nationally known brass band would play for 
local crowds there on Saturday afternoons.41  According to 
one Tennessee reporter, “these regulars marched with an 
ease and precision that caught every eye along the route, 
while the sweetness and novelty of their quicksteps pleased 
the ear already tired with a surfeit of Sousa music.”42 
With the declaration of war against Spain on April 25, 
1898, the United States launched itself onto the world stage 
in a new way. By the end of the conflict in December of 
1898, the United States would be a colonial power, taking 
possession of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. 
Fighting would continue however, as Filippinos sought 
independence from their new colonial masters.43 This 
conflict would see service by most regular army cavalry 
regiments. Additionally, three volunteer cavalry, regiments 
were formed. Only the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry 
or the “Rough Riders,” would see combat service.44  
This conflict would require a mobilization of troops from 
Jefferson Barracks like it had never seen before. Missouri 
would recruit more volunteers than almost any other 
state, the majority of whom would pass through Jefferson 
Barracks.45  
With the completion of an electric rail line, large 
patriotic crowds regularly visited the barracks to celebrate 
the troops and their overseas mission. The largest of the 
crowds was estimated to be almost 100,000 people.46 
Several cavalry units would move in and out of the post 
in this period, returning from or heading to service in Cuba 
and the Philippines. The 3rd Cavalry left the post for Cuba 
when the war broke out, serving honorably at the Battle of 
Santiago and playing a key role in the capture of San Juan 
Hill. The 6th Cavalry came to Jefferson Barracks in 1899, 
but left shortly after for service in the Philippines.  Finally, 
the 5th Cavalry commanded Jefferson Barracks from 1900 
to 1902.47  
Conclusion
Even before the beginning of the Spanish-American 
War, there were signs that changes were coming for the 
cavalry service.  In 1897, 23 members of the African 
American 25th Infantry participated in an experiment. 
They rode bicycles from Fort Mizzoula in Montana to 
Jefferson Barracks. This trip of 1,900 miles was organized 
as the Army looked to new technologies to move troops. 
While many decried the experiment, believing that 
“transporting soldiers by any means other than the horse 
ran counter to...the cavalry’s feeling that an eternal bond 
exists between a soldier and his steed,” others recognized 
that industrialization was bringing with it necessary 
changes in the way war would be waged.48  
While the horse cavalry would remain in existence 
until 1944, the ride of the 25th Infantry can be seen as a 
foreshadowing of the mechanization of the cavalry that 
would take place as the army entered the twentieth century. 
From 1833 until the turn of the century, the story of the 
United States Cavalry at Jefferson Barracks is the story of 
the U.S. Cavalry nationally from its establishment until the 
decline of the horse. It is the story of westward expansion, 
and of the decline of Indian autonomy. Perhaps most of all 
it is the story of the men and women who served, coming 
from all walks of life and dedicating themselves for better 
or worse to the monumental challenge of living up to 
the spirit of the American Cavalry, the “Courageous and 
Faithful.”
3rd Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1896. (Image: St. 
Louis County Parks)
Man on horseback at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1897. (Image: 
St. Louis County Parks)
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(Editor’s Note: This is the first of two articles on the Missouri Conservation Commission. It details the state of 
conservation in Missouri before 1937, the role Nash Buckingham played in getting the amendment on the 1936 ballot, 
and how Aldo Leopold’s work in the early 1930s influenced the writing of the amendment and the direction of the new 
commission and its early research. The second article will look at how biologists carried out their research for the new 
science-based Missouri Conservation Commission.) 
The Missouri Conservation Commission
Part I:
The need for it and the constitutional amendment that established it
B Y  Q U I N T A  S C O T T
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 Whetstone Creek Conservation Area in Callaway County reflects the landscape early settlers found when they 
came west into central Missouri north of the Missouri River. Prairies, pockmarked with ephemeral wetlands, covered 
the flat landscape. Where clay underlay a thin layer of loess, it impeded drainage and flatwoods, treed in stumpy 
oaks anchored in shallow soil, took root. Along the creeks and ephemeral drainages, woodlands grew in loamy 
soils.
 The settlers named the region Nine Mile Prairie. Nine Mile Prairie Township is 47,001 acres, of which 5,858 
acres are in public use. Today, the Missouri Department of Conservation manages two refuges on the prairie, the 
Whetstone Creek Conservation Area, which is open to the public, and the Prairie Fork Conservation Area, which is 
set aside for research and not open to the public. 
 The Missouri Department of Conservation manages Whetstone Creek for Bobwhite quail and other small game. 
The decline of Bobwhite quail and other game in the early twentieth century prompted the establishment of the 
Federation of Missouri Sportsmen and the passage of the constitutional amendment that created the Missouri 
Conservation Commission. (Image: Quinta Scott)
Aldo Leopold and Nash Buckingham, the first 
a pioneer in land management for wildlife from 
Wisconsin, the second a passionate and popular 
nature writer and avid duck hunter from Tennessee: 
both had a hand in pressing Missouri voters to pass 
the constitutional amendment that established an 
independent conservation commission. Both were 
well connected in the nascent field of conservation 
and land and game management. Leopold supplied 
the philosophical framework that guided the intent 
of the constitutional amendment that established the 
nonpolitical Missouri Conservation Commission as a 
science-based organization. Buckingham supplied the 
legwork. Buckingham loved ducks, he loved quail, 
and he loved shooting. He wrote for Field and Stream, 
Sports Afield, Outdoors, American Field, and others. 
He had a following among sport hunters and fishers, 
who were concerned about the decline in small game. 
In April 1935, Roland Hoerr, a St. Louis 
industrialist and president of the Missouri Duck 
Hunter’s Association, wrote Nash Buckingham asking 
him for “information as to how the sportsmen of 
Tennessee organized the State in order to put through 
the Commission bill.” Buckingham responded that 
he and Matt Thomas of Knoxville had organized a 
statewide federation of sport hunters that helped push 
the game commission bill through the Tennessee 
legislature in 1935. Buckingham emphasized that 
“your bill must be right. The man you select for 
executive secretary is all important.” He offered 
to help Hoerr organize a federation, but he would 
have to be replaced by a Missourian. Buckingham 
traveled statewide, interviewing possible candidates, 
including E. Sidney Stephens, to head the organization 
that became the Federation of Missouri Sportsmen. 
Stephens accepted the job at a meeting of the group in 
August 1935.1
Buckingham and Leopold—along with members 
of the American Legion, the Isaak Walton League, 
and dozens of Missouri sports hunters and fishers—
gathered signatures for the initiative petition that put 
the constitutional amendment on the November 1936 
ballot. The amendment passed, and the Missouri 
Conservation Commission opened for business in July 
1937. 
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The State of Game in 1937: The Need for 
a Conservation Commission
For more than a century before Missouri passed its 
constitutional amendment, its citizens broke the prairie and 
cleared the land for row crops or pasture for livestock, cut 
the forests for railroad ties or simply let them burn, drained 
the swamps, and gave no thought to the maintenance of 
wildlife. By the end of the nineteenth century, hunters had 
killed or driven the last of the large mammals from the 
state. During the period of settlement, 1800–1850, large 
animals—antelope, buffalo, black bears, and panthers—
disappeared, killed for their meat or pelts, leaving only a 
few individuals. Only deer survived, though in reduced 
numbers. Badgers were gone by 1870, and passenger 
pigeons were decimated and gone by 1890. Farm game–
quail, rabbit, skunk, and dove–thrived, at least for a while, 
on the newly cleared agricultural lands, but as farmers 
instituted modern agricultural methods, small game lost 
habitat. Missourians had yet to take up hunting game for 
sport, but market hunters had, for cash, not for sport.2
Concern over the amount of game market hunters took 
from Missouri’s fields and forests led to the passage of its 
first statewide game law in 1874. It was titled An Act for 
the Preservation of Game, Animals, and Birds. The law 
set open and closed seasons for game, including deer, wild 
turkey, and quail; forbad the netting of quail and prairie 
chicken, save on a person’s own land or by permission of 
the landowner; forbad the possession, purchase, sale, or 
transportation of listed species during closed seasons; and 
charged constables, marshals, market-masters, and police 
to arrest all violators. The lawmakers made exceptions to 
the rules: Farmers had permission to shoot any critter they 
found eating their crops, fruit, or grapes. Any scientist who 
wished to study a bird’s habits or history had permission to 
kill it and stuff it. Market hunters ignored the law. 
In the years following the passage of the 1874 act, 
market hunting reached its peak. Market hunters 
transported their kill to city markets on better roads. Their 
city customers had no idea that Missouri’s wild game was 
disappearing. While Missouri sport hunters did not take 
up guns in great numbers until about 1920, when they 
did, they added to the carnage. Game wardens had few 
funds with which to carry out their duties. Market-masters 
had a commercial interest in the continued flow of game. 
Hence, the attitudes of constables, marshals, and police 
charged with arresting violators reflected that of the rest 
of the population.3 As yet, there was no demand for the 
preservation of game.
In Missouri, deer, so plentiful in the twenty-first century that they verge on being pests, survived only in the southern Ozark 
Counties in the 1930s. (Image: David Stoner, Missouri Department of Conservation)
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Painted Rock Conservation Area, Osage County, Missouri 
(Image: Quinta Scott)
Private Game Preserves
As early as 1877, private citizens from Jefferson City 
leased land at Painted Rock on the Osage River. When the 
owner of the land wanted to subdivide and sell the land 
in 1907, a group of hunters organized the Painted Rock 
Country Club, purchased all 1,086 acres, and opened 
membership to dignitaries living in the state capitol.4 
While everyday sport hunters may not have taken up 
sport hunting en masse until about 1920, wealthy city 
dwellers set up their own preserves for hunting and 
fishing. In 1891, alarmed at the decimation of Missouri’s 
deer, Moses Wetmore, president of Liggett and Meyers 
Tobacco in St. Louis; George McCann, president of 
Old Coon Tobacco in Springfield; and others formed a 
corporation, the St. Louis Game Park and Agricultural 
Company. They bought land in Taney County for a private 
preserve, a game-park and resort, where they bred deer for 
sport hunting and food. They also planned to mill timber; 
grow grain, fruit, and farm produce; raise livestock; and 
create a zoological preserve. In 1893, they fenced off 
500 acres with an eight- to nine-foot deer-proof fence. 
By 1896, they had amassed 5,000 acres on the west bank 
of the White River near the tiny village of Mincy, which 
they stocked with deer—native whitetails, reds, blacktails, 
and fallows—to which they added Angora goats, elk from 
Illinois, and dozens of Mongolian pheasants. 
The company built a hunting lodge on a bald 
overlooking the river, installed deer on another 2,500 acres 
behind a deer-proof fence, and opened for business in 
November 1896. At a time when people in the Ozarks used 
fire indiscriminately to clear pastureland and burn ticks 
and chiggers, gamekeepers at the park used controlled 
burns, one hillside at a time when weather conditions were 
right, to maintain a fire line around the deer enclosure. 
Both the Painted Rock Country Club and the St. Louis 
Agricultural Park would be incorporated into the Missouri 
Department of Conservation’s system of refuges in the 
twentieth century.
The St. Louis Game and Agricultural Company, Taney 
County. Steep ridges, deep hollows, moderately sloping 
uplands, cedar glades, oak-hickory-pine forests, creeks, 
a sinkhole, and three miles of bank on the White River 
characterized the game park. (Image: Quinta Scott)
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Big Spring State Park, Carter County (Image: Quinta Scott)
Walmsley Law
The work of private sport hunters at Painted Rock and 
Mincy did nothing to quell the slaughter of wildlife by 
market hunters, who sold close to four million pounds of 
game, most of it illegal, in 1904. But by that year, sport 
hunters outnumbered market hunters and demanded 
changes in the laws governing hunting and fishing.5 
In 1905, Missouri passed the Walmsley Law, which 
continued open and closed seasons to manage hunting, 
but enforced the law whimsically. At first the legislature 
gave title to all fish and game to the state, provided for the 
sale of hunting and fishing licenses, and allocated game 
wardens $50,000 for a “game protection fund.” It looked 
like a sound, comprehensive law, but two years later the 
legislature gave title of fish and game back to land owners 
and cut the appropriation for enforcement to $8,000. 
Lawmakers gave title to game back to the state in 1909 
and established the State Game and Fish Commission, but 
they took away the annual appropriation for enforcement. 
From henceforth, only the sale of hunting and fishing 
licenses would fund the enforcement of game laws. 
In 1917, Missouri recognized the need for public 
recreation and passed the State Park Fund Act, which 
allocated 5 percent of the funds collected from the sales 
of licenses to the purchase and maintenance of state parks 
on land that was well-watered and suitable for wildlife. 
Big Spring State Park opened in 1924, and eight more 
followed within a year, bringing 23,244 acres into public 
ownership. At the end of World War I, the state purchased 
or leased game farms that would function as refuges. 
While lawmakers raised the allotment to 25 percent in 
1925, the parks and game farms remained underfunded 
and undeveloped.6 
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Aldo Leopold’s Game Survey of the North 
Central States
What happened in Missouri also happened in the 
surrounding states: game lost out to the “axe, plow, cow, 
fire, and gun,” the tools used to clear the landscape for 
crops and pasture. Aldo Leopold used these words to 
describe the disappearance of game from Midwest fields 
and forests. A pioneer in wildlife conservation, Leopold 
developed the concept of “wildlife-from-the-land,” or 
land management for game, that would direct the work of 
Missouri’s young Conservation Commission. In 1929 and 
1930, he conducted a survey of game in the central and 
northern Midwest for the Sporting Arms and Ammunition 
Manufacturer’s Institute and published it in 1931 under the 
title Game Survey of the North Central States. By the late 
1920s, sport hunters, the buyers of guns and ammunition, 
finally showed genuine alarm over the decimation of game 
and furbearing animals. Just as Nash Buckingham would 
enlist their help several years later in getting signatures 
on the ballot initiative for the Constitutional Amendment 
that established the Conservation Commission, Leopold 
enlisted their help with the survey. In Missouri 129 
people–members of the Isaak Walton League, game 
wardens, foresters, sport hunters and anglers, and 
academics–aided the effort. After he finished his survey, 
he laid out his theory of land and game management in 
Game Management, published in 1933, in which Leopold 
proposed that wildlife could be restored through the 
creative use of the same tools used to destroy it: “axe, 
plow, cow, fire, and gun.” 
In his Game Survey and Game Management, Leopold 
recommended that nonpartisan conservation commissions 
be established in the states he studied; that they have 
members with staggered terms and free of political 
influence; and that hunters and nonhunters alike—the 
general public—share in the cost of wildlife, both game 
and nongame, conservation.7 
In the midst of the Great Depression, with income to 
Missouri’s Game and Fish Commission declining, with 
its personnel in constant flux, and with game depleted 
and little money going into its replenishment, E. Sydney 
Stephens and the Federation of Missouri Sportsmen 
wanted to do just that: take conservation out of the hands 
of politicians. They wrote a constitutional amendment to 
create a conservation commission to protect and restore 
the state’s fish, wildlife, and forests. Up until then, 
political appointees had directed Missouri’s Game and 
Fish Commission, the predecessor to the Conservation 
Commission. Hence, policy and personnel could shift as 
often as a new administration came into office, every four 
years. As Leopold noted in his Game Survey, Missouri 
employed the “‘game warden’ type” of conservation 
department that relied “on an unstable executive 
appointed by the governor.” Missouri’s Game and Fish 
Commissioner managed six hatcheries and 36 wardens, 
all reporting to three division chiefs; fourteen state parks, 
which served as workable game refuges; and fourteen 
wildlife refuges, which the state leased from farmers. 
Game and Fish did not coordinate with the state’s other 
conservation activities and exercised no regulatory power. 
That was the province of the governor. 
Stephens and his group wanted to put conservation and 
restoration in the hands of professional game managers 
who would operate under the direction of a nonpartisan 
commission, in which each of its four members would 
serve staggered six-year terms. His desire to remove the 
conservation of Missouri’s game from politics extended to 
the writing of the amendment. Allowing the legislature to 
write such a law would leave it in the political arena and 
open to future changes. Allowing the legislature to write 
the amendment would take its wording out of Stephens’ 
hands. To that end, he established a committee of thirteen 
directors, one from each congressional district, which 
drafted the wording of the amendment. Because each 
member of the new commission would serve a six-year 
term, appointments would be staggered administration to 
administration. The amendment would create a science-
based agency with authority over Missouri’s wildlife, 
fish, and forests.8 But few people understood the concept 
of science-based management of wildlife. Here again, 
Aldo Leopold fleshed out the idea that landscape could be 
managed for the benefit of wildlife. 
How the state handled wildlife conservation before and 
after passage of the Walmsley Law hadn’t worked. When 
Leopold performed his December 1929–January 1930 
survey of wildlife in Missouri, he found rabbits abundant, 
even though the rabbit meat industry in Missouri was 
the largest in the region, but he found quail and prairie 
chickens declining. He attributed their declines to the 
plowing of the prairies for wheat and corn. 
“The survey is financed
by the sporting arms and 
ammunition industry.
The motive hardly requires 
explanation: success in game 
restoration means continuance
of the industry; failure in game 
restoration means its shrinkage
and ultimate liquidation.”
—Aldo Leopold, 1931 
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Leopold did not develop his theories in a vacuum. 
Shortly before he started his survey, Herbert L. Stoddard 
published his seminal study of Bobwhite quail in the 
longleaf pine and wiregrass ecosystem of Georgia’s 
Red Hills, recognized as the first field study on land 
management for wildlife.9 Stoddard documented the 
quail’s food preferences: weed seeds, grain, and ground 
cover that farmers despise; fruits, mast, and nuts from 
trees; legumes; cultivated grains after harvest; and crickets, 
grasshoppers, beetles, spiders, ants, or whatever insects 
could be found on the ground or were within jumping 
distance. Young quail eat mostly insects until they are 
about three weeks old. During those three weeks they 
gradually add seeds and grains to their diets until at three 
weeks they are eating the same foods as their parents. 
Much of their diet can be found in the cover they depend 
on, thickets and vine tangles along fences and roadsides. 
He documented their predators: Humans find them tasty. 
So do hawks, skunks, raccoons, and snakes. Stoddard was 
fifty years ahead of his time in his use of controlled burns 
to manage wildlife habitat. Foresters and public agencies 
in the 1920s and 1930s opposed their use. Stoddard 
recommended fire to enhance the growth of quail food 
and recognized that the quail could thrive at the edge 
of the longleaf pine-wiregrass forest. To maintain the 
edge, however, fire had to be used to control mid-story 
underbrush and preserve an understory of the quail’s 
favorite foods, grasses and legumes; to eliminate habitat 
for quail predators; and to promote places for quail to 
escape predators.10 
In his chapter on Bobwhite quail in Game Survey, 
Leopold described the four stages of landscape 
development that led to the quail’s decline in the Midwest. 
He guessed that during presettlement times, quail lived 
at the edges of open woodlands that were maintained by 
frequent fire. 
As farmers settled the landscape, they brought “crude 
agriculture,” characterized by “grain fields, civilized 
seeds, and rail fences,” along which weeds and vines grew 
up. They cut the woods, left “brushy stump lots,” and 
added “Osage orange (Maclura pomifera) hedges to the 
quail environment.” In short, they may have changed the 
environment, but quail could thrive as farmers extended 
their clearings to the edges of the woods. 
Next, farmers replaced the weedy rail fences with wire, 
cleared the stumps from the brushy woods for pasture, 
and tore out the Osage orange hedges. Quail lost food 
and cover. And, hunters began shooting quail instead of 
trapping them. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
farmers allowed marginal fields to revert to brush, weeds, 
Bobwhite Quail Covey in Snow (Image: Missouri Department of Conservation)
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and vines. Quail found food and cover, but good roads 
increased population. Hunters with more leisure time 
and better guns and ammunition offset the reversion of 
marginal lands. Finally, hunters realized that quail had 
become a finite resource and demanded conservation 
measures and the introduction of pen-raised birds or birds 
imported from other countries.
In his study of the decline of quail in Missouri, Leopold 
offered as an example the history of a farm on Nine Mile 
Prairie, where Boone’s Lick Trail marked the northern 
boundary of the farm. In 1923, the farmer Phil Smith 
restored a grain farm, using modern agricultural standards. 
The land was half in timber and had never been grazed. 
He cleared brush from the fence lines and out of the 
gullies, which he filled. He cut the Osage hedgerows 
and converted brushy woodland to pasture, where his 
livestock could graze. According to modern methods, he 
rotated his crops to conserve the fertility of the soil, and he 
loved quail and hunted them. He counted 210 quail on his 
property in 1923. Within seven years of clearing his land 
and introducing modern agricultural techniques, ninety 
quail remained. He thought he had shot too many. Leopold 
concluded that the very farm improvements had reduced 
the quail’s numbers, because the bird lost food and cover.11
In developing his management plan for quail, Leopold 
focused on open and closed seasons, particularly in 
Missouri’s fledgling system of refuges, located in ten 
Ozark counties. Even given a ten-mile zone surrounding 
each refuge, he concluded that none of Missouri’s refuges 
would have enough acreage to sustain healthy populations 
of quail, particularly for hunting and trapping. Refuges 
would have to be restocked with quail raised in pens. In 
determining the allowable kill in refuges, whether public 
or private, Stoddard had noted that killing 33 percent 
of the population was safe. The kill rate, which seldom 
acknowledged the number of birds crippled, could be 
higher on well-managed lands, but 50 percent was too 
high. Finally, Leopold encouraged managers and hunters 
to think of population growth or the productivity of the 
crop and kill rates in terms of numbers per acre, be it 
quail, turkey, or deer.12 
Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: In Callaway County, where Nathan Boone, son of Daniel, surveyed Boone’s Lick Trail 
in 1815, and his cousin, Samuel Boone, purchased land and settled on the southeastern edge of Nine Mile Prairie in 1818. 
They arrived as settlers and hunted and trapped the prairies, which they looked upon as wet, marshy, bug infested, and 
dangerous, worthless for any agricultural activity other than grazing. Instead, they settled in timber along the creeks, where 
they found wood and water, and they tilled only at the very edges of the prairies. (Image: Quinta Scott)
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Nine Mile Prairie Farm cultivated to the edge of the road with little cover on the roadside or between fields. (Image: Quinta 
Scott)
Nine Mile Prairie: Weeds, trees, and vines along a roadside and between cultivated fields, Callaway County, Missouri. 
(Image: Quinta Scott)
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Aldo Leopold’s Sketch of Improvements to the Smith Farm, Callaway County, Missouri.
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The Prairie Fork Conservation Area is no more than a 
half-mile down the road from the Smith Farm. In 1997, 
Ted and Pat Jones donated 711 acres of farmland near 
their home in Williamsburg to the Missouri Department 
of Conservation. Most of the region around the refuge 
is devoted to row crops or livestock grazing. The MDC 
is restoring the fields to prairie, using a combination of 
applications of herbicides and controlled burns, followed 
by the planting of native grasses and forbs, food for quail 
and other small game. The area is not open to public use, 
but is reserved for education and research into the role of 
soils and water in conservation.
Prarie Fork Conservation Area, Callaway County, Missouri (Image: Quinta Scott)
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Management of Turkey and Deer
When Leopold finished examining quail and other small 
game birds—pheasant, Hungarian partridge, ruffed grouse, 
and prairie chickens—he turned to big game, including 
turkey and deer. Northern Missouri had seen its last 
turkey in 1895. Southern Missouri had the only remaining 
turkey range in the states he studied. First, he numbered 
the turkeys found in southern Missouri—4,024 in 1925 
and 7,000 in 1927. Then, he outlined a turkey study: trap 
and band all turkeys found in refuges to determine the 
best cover for turkeys, the best food at every season, the 
diseases and parasites that affect turkeys, the predators that 
kill turkeys or rob their nests, how turkeys avoid predators, 
the ratio of males to females, and how many males must be 
around to maintain or increase the population.13
Finished with turkeys, Leopold turned to deer. 
While northern Missouri had seen its last deer in 1884, 
Missouri counted 564 deer spread out across 24 southern 
Missouri counties in 1926. Leopold noted that that was 
an underestimate because Missouri had planted 300 in 
five state parks since then. Because there were so many 
unanswered questions about deer management, such as 
how to gauge the age of a deer, he laid out a similar, if less 
specific, outline for the study of deer. He addressed many 
of his recommendations to the northern states around the 
Great Lakes, where deer were losing winter cover and 
food as logging companies cut cedar swamps for posts and 
pulpwood, but where deer formed herds in the winter and 
searched out cedar plantations for both food and cover. As 
for Missouri, he noted that the state had a series of game 
refuges, where hunting seasons could be set.14
Fall Turkeys (Image: Missouri Department of Conservation)
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Leopold’s Recommendations for Land 
and Game Management
Leopold concluded his survey with a series of 
recommendations for land management: bring as much 
land as possible into public ownership as funds are 
available and with attention to game management, 
forestry, watershed protection, and recreation. (Here, 
he noted that Missourians offered the most resistance 
to public ownership of land, even though Missouri 
had a system of state parks and refuges.) Make 
game management a public/private effort. Protect 
private landowners from irresponsible hunters and 
compensate them for preserving game. Train foresters 
and game wardens in research, management, and the 
administration of conservation agencies. Do the research 
in land management that will make game abundant in 
the wild. Recognize that everyone, hunters and non-
hunters alike, is responsible for conservation. Pay for 
conservation not only through licenses for sport hunters 
and fishers, but through taxes on all citizens. Beg for 
private funds, if necessary, to educate the public and to 
do the scientific research.15
Leopold fleshed out all these recommendations 
in Game Management two years later, in which he 
defined game management as “the art of producing 
sustained crops of game for recreational use,” game 
administration as “the art of governing the practice of 
game management,” and game policy as “the plan of 
administration adopted by government.”
He outlined the tools for managing the land for game 
and game itself: control hunting, historically the first 
technique of game management, by setting bag limits. 
Echoing Stoddard’s work on quail, managers had to be 
able to measure the breeding rates for individual species 
against its kill ratios: How many turkeys or deer could 
hunters kill or cripple while leaving enough animals 
in the wild to maintain and increase their populations? 
Recognize that landowners are also custodians of the 
state’s game and let them be compensated for the game 
that hunters kill on their lands. Help them understand 
that game is a crop. Train them to employ the tools they 
use to raise row crops to cultivate food and cover for 
wildlife. Cover functions as shelter from the sun, as 
escape from predators, as nesting places, as material for 
nesting from the previous year, as a place to loaf, and as 
food. Modern agriculture destroys cover and food, but 
doesn’t have to if plants that supply game with food and 
cover are left to grow along fences or between fields. 
Smith Farm, 2015. A weed-filled gully runs through a soybean field edged with trees, vines, and grasses along the 
roadside, all food and cover for quail. This field is at the site of the farm Aldo Leopold used as an illustration in his 
1930 Game Survey. (Image: Quinta Scott)
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Beyond that, create refuges that are closed to hunting. 
Leopold saw the refuge as a sanctuary, a breeding ground, 
and a place that creates such an abundance of game 
that the excess population can flow out and restock its 
surrounding region. A refuge must be an integral part of its 
region, and its region must be suitable to individual species 
the refuge addresses. Leopold separated parks—dedicated 
to game, natural attractions, and recreation—from refuges, 
dedicated to restocking species in the surrounding area. 
In parks, excess population growth of game can lead to 
incidental restocking, an unintended plus.
Increase game by controlling predators, by providing 
game with cover, by improving food sources for prey, by 
understanding alternative food sources for predators, and 
by using predators to prey on other predators. 
Just as game managers had to learn the food preferences 
of predators, they had to learn food and water preferences 
of individual species of game. What do turkeys or quail eat 
at each stage in life? What would they find in each season 
of the year? What tastes good? What are they accustomed 
to and how do they find it? Do they need supplemental 
food in the winter? What kind? Managers had to have a 
similar understanding about water. Doves and turkeys 
drink water from running creeks or quiet ponds. So do 
deer. Quails, partridges, pheasants, and grouse depend on 
dew. Big game and rodents munch on plants for water, 
what Leopold called “succulence.” Leopold concluded that 
refuge managers had to supply food plots and ponds to 
supplement food and water.16 
 Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: Sunflower Winter Food Plot. (Image: Quinta Scott)
Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: Wildlife Pond and Cover. (Image: Quinta Scott)
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Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: Wildlife Pond and Cover. (Image: Quinta Scott) Caney Mountain Conservation Area, Ozark County (Image: Quinta Scott)
Pittman-Robertson Act of 1937
Even before he completed his Game Survey, Leopold 
attended the Seventeenth American Game Conference 
in December 1930, where he and others laid out the 
American Game Policy, an acknowledgment that current 
conservation efforts were not working anywhere. 
The policy declared that wildlife management be 
developed into a profession, that scientifically trained 
personnel direct wildlife restoration, and that a stable 
funding mechanism for restoration be developed. 
Carl Shoemaker, a special investigator for the U.S. 
Senate Special Committee on Conservation of Wildlife 
Resources, turned the conservationists’ policy proposals 
into the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act 
of 1937, which granted funds to state fish and wildlife 
agencies for restoration projects through the Federal 
Aid to Wildlife Program. Funding came through user 
fees on the purchase of firearms, ammunition, and 
archery equipment. The newly independent Missouri 
Conservation Commission would use Pittman-Robertson 
funds to hire scientifically trained personnel—
biologists—in its effort to build its wildlife restoration 
program.17
Missouri’s Game Survey
The publication of Leopold’s game survey in 1931 
prompted the states to conduct surveys of their own. In 
1934, Dr. Rudolf Bennitt, a biologist at the University 
of Missouri, and his student, Werner O. Nagel, followed 
with a more specific Survey of Resident Game and 
Furbearers in Missouri. They identified fewer than 
100 ruffed grouse, not more than 2,000 deer, and about 
3,500 wild turkeys. In addition, they noted that quail and 
rabbits were declining along with raccoons, muskrats, 
and mink. They took no census of fish, but severe 
drought and wild fires in abused forests, where eroded 
soils slipped down steep hillsides to muddy streams, led 
to the decline of the state’s fisheries. Bennitt and Nagel’s 
conclusions echoed Leopold’s: game restoration and 
management depended on professional administration, 
scientific research, trained professional foresters and 
game managers, and an educated public that understood 
its role in conservation. This would be the job of a new 
Conservation Commission. Bennitt and Nagel published 
their survey in 1937.18
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This 1818 map by John Melish shows St. Louis in the context of Alton, Carondelet, and Cahokia, suggesting the region as 
Clark knew it. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
B Y  A N D R E W  C O O P E R M A N
 The American Revolution is typically viewed as 
primarily an East Coast affair, fought between Americans 
and their French allies on the one hand, and the British and 
their German mercenaries on the other. Certainly, the war 
fought in the East was critical to the creation and survival 
of the United States. But it was the war fought in the West 
that was critical to the growth and development of the 
new republic. In the trans-Appalachian West, Americans 
fought alongside the Spanish while the British employed 
warriors from various tribes of First Nations. These armies 
were much smaller than their eastern counterparts, and so 
too were the battles that they fought. Nevertheless, in the 
West as in the East, Americans acting in conjunction with 
a major European power fought battles that determined the 
future of the United States and the American people.
 One such battle was fought in St. Louis and Cahokia 
on May 26, 1780, and while the Battle of Fort San Carlos 
is little known outside this area, it was tremendously 
important. For it was at Cahokia that George Rogers Clark 
and his mixed force of Anglo-American frontiersmen and 
Illinois French destroyed British plans for a sweep through 
the Mississippi Valley. It was American military control 
of the trans-Appalachian West, tenuous though it was, 
combined with the skill and perseverance of American 
negotiators in Paris, which enabled the newborn United 
States to set its western border on the Mississippi River 
instead of the Appalachian Mountains.1  
 Like the battle itself, the importance of the Village of 
Cahokia to the Patriot cause and the Allied war effort in 
the West is little known. But it was at Cahokia that Clark 
negotiated precious months of peace with regional First 
Nations. It was Cahokia that served as both a shield for 
defense and a staging area for offense. It was Cahokia that 
served as the link between the Americans and their Spanish 
allies. And it was at Cahokia that a trans-Appalachian 
America was secured.
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Cahokia
 Cahokia was founded by the Seminary Priests of the 
Foreign Mission of Quebec in January of 1699. It was the 
first permanent French settlement in the Mid-Mississippi 
Valley, and today it is the oldest town on the Mississippi 
River. The Seminary Priests came to preach the gospel 
to the Cahokia and Tamaroa Indians, members of the 
Illiniwek Confederacy. Over time the priests were joined 
by fur traders and farmers. Close to the mouths of the 
Missouri and Illinois rivers, Cahokia was an excellent 
location for the fur trade, and the fertile valley in which 
it lay, eventually known as the American Bottoms, made 
Cahokia ideal for farming. Joining the Illiniwek and the 
French Canadians were enslaved Africans.2
 This mixed community suffered a double blow in 
the mid-1760s. First, as a result of the French and Indian 
War, France ceded much of her North American empire, 
including the Illinois Country, in 1763. Cahokia was 
now a possession of England, the ancient enemy of the 
Gallic people. England was also a Protestant nation, often 
hostile to Catholicism and Catholics. The priests sold their 
property in Cahokia and crossed the Mississippi River to 
what had become Spanish Upper Louisiana. They were 
soon followed by many other residents of Cahokia, all 
seeking refuge in the territory of Catholic Spain.3
 The second blow came when Pierre Leclede and 
Auguste Chouteau founded a fur trading post almost 
directly across the Mississippi River from Cahokia in 
February of 1764. St. Louis almost immediately ended 
Cahokia’s role in the fur trade. No longer an active 
Catholic mission or a center of the fur trade, Cahokia 
became primarily an agricultural community. This was the 
town that Capt. Joseph Bowman and his 30 mounted “Big 
Knives” entered on July 6, 1778. 
 
George Rogers Clark
& The Western Campaign
 Bowman and his men were part of the small army 
raised by George Rogers Clark in 1778 to fight the 
British and their Indian allies primarily in the Mississippi, 
Wabash, and Ohio River Valleys. Their mission was to 
seize control of strategic locations and thereby thwart raids 
into Kentucky. Clark firmly believed that the very survival 
of the Kentucky settlements depended on offensive rather 
than defensive action. The war had to be taken to the 
enemy. But the authority and resources to raise such a 
force and conduct such a campaign required the consent 
and assistance of Virginia, of which Kentucky was then a 
county.4
 Clark left Kentucky in October of 1777 to appeal to 
Virginia’s government to authorize and support his plan. 
Clark was persuasive in large measure due to his extensive 
cache of intelligence and his ability to connect Kentucky’s 
interests with those of the rest of Virginia. Clark had 
sent spies to the Illinois Country to ascertain British 
strength, French sentiment, Indian intentions, and Spanish 
sympathies. What they learned and what Clark reported 
to the Virginia government was encouraging. British 
strength was based at Detroit, far to the north of Clark’s 
immediate objectives in the Mississippi and Wabash River 
Valleys. Further, they “had but little expectation of a visit 
from us. . . .”5 The Illinois French in those areas were at 
best lukewarm to the British and would likely support the 
Patriot cause. The Indians were indeed intent on attacking 
Kentucky. Lastly, the Spanish in St. Louis appeared 
sympathetic to the Americans despite Spain’s official 
neutrality.6 
 In addition to presenting actionable intelligence, Clark 
also described how Virginia’s more easterly settlements 
would be exposed to Indian attacks if the Kentucky 
settlements were destroyed or abandoned. British-
sponsored Indian attacks on Kentucky had increased 
sharply during 1777, and the Virginia county simply did 
not have the resources to provide for its own defense. If 
assistance from Williamsburg was not forthcoming, then 
these western settlements would either be destroyed or 
abandoned, leaving more easterly settlements open to 
attack. It was therefore in Virginia’s interests to support her 
most western county in its hour of need.  
 Clark presented his plan to Governor Patrick Henry 
George Rogers Clark (1752–1818) was the second-oldest 
brother of explorer and Missouri territorial governor William 
Clark.  As a Brigadier General in the Virginia militia, he 
was the highest-ranking American officer in the Ohio Valley 
during the War of Independence.  Debts he incurred during 
the war to supply his troops left his personal finances in ruins 
for the rest of his life.  George Catlin painted this miniature 
portrait on ivory from an earlier portrait. (Image: Missouri 
History Museum)
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on December 10, 1777. Henry approved the plan, as did 
Virginia’s Council, on January 2, 1778, while the General 
Assembly authorized the creation of a force “to march 
against and attack any of our western enemies.” Clark was 
commissioned a lieutenant colonel in the Virginia regular 
army (as opposed to militia) and given wide-ranging 
discretion to conduct the campaign as he saw fit.7
 Clark’s first objective was to actually raise an army. 
Recruiting was somewhat less than successful, and Clark 
eventually had to settle for a force of only 175 men 
instead of the 350 to 500 he had originally envisioned. 
Clark compensated for this by instilling a bit of military 
discipline and rigorously training what troops he did 
have. The small army, referred to as the “Big Knives” 
by the First Nations and the Illinois French, left Corn 
Island, future site of Louisville, on June 24, 1778. Its first 
objective was the de facto capitol of the British Illinois 
Country: Kaskaskia. 
 Clark captured Kaskaskia on the evening of July 4, 
1778. Lacking a sizable army, Clark used speed, surprise, 
and psychology to subdue the Illinois French residents 
of the village. Clark’s use of psychology to first instill 
fear of his men and then support for the Patriot cause was 
masterful. The residents of Kaskaskia quickly and eagerly 
joined Clark, Virginia, and the United States, taking a 
loyalty oath on July 5. With Kaskaskia secure, Clark 
ordered Capt. Bowman and a company of 30 mounted 
men to ride north and take control of Prairie du Rocher, St. 
Philippe, and Cahokia.8
 Bowman and his men, joined by local Illinois French, 
rode out of Kaskaskia on July 5. Both Prairie du Rocher 
and St. Philippe fell quickly. Like Clark, Bowman used 
speed and surprise to good effect. But he also had several 
residents of Kaskaskia to vouch for his good intentions and 
the Patriot cause. The residents of both Prairie du Rocher 
and St. Philippe surrendered quickly and as Bowman 
wrote, “were willing to comply with any terms I should 
propose.”9 
 So it was that the Americans rode into Cahokia 
on July 6. According to Bowman, “We rode up to 
the commander’s house and demanded a surrender. 
He accordingly surrendered himself, likewise all the 
inhabitants of the place.” But whereas the residents 
of Kaskaskia, Prairie du Rocher, and St. Philippe had 
surrendered immediately and unconditionally, the people 
of Cahokia were a bit more difficult for the Big Knives to 
bend to their will. Bowman continues: “I then demanded 
of them to take the oath of fidelity to the states, otherwise 
I should treat them as enemies. They told me they would 
give me an answer next morning.” Adding to Bowman’s 
worries that first night, “there was a man in the town 
who would call in one hundred and fifty Indians to his 
assistance and cut me off. This fellow I took care to 
secure; but we lay upon our arms the whole of the night. . 
. .” Fortunately, Bowman and his men “took possession of 
a strong stone house, well fortified for war,” and thus had a 
secure place to lay upon their arms.10 
 The next morning, the villagers agreed to take the 
oath of allegiance to Virginia and the United States, having 
made their point by waiting some 12 hours to do so. Even 
so, according to Clark, “some Individuals said that the 
Town was given up too tamely. . . .”11 This was the first, 
but by no means the last, time that the people of Cahokia 
demonstrated an independent streak. 
 As commanding officer in Cahokia, Bowman was 
responsible for both military and civilian affairs. His first 
priority was to provide for the defense of the village. The 
old ramshackle French fort that once stood where Village 
Hall is today had been quickly replaced by the British 
in 1765 by the stone rectory which stood in what is now 
called the Cahokia Wedge. Like his British predecessors, 
Bowman decided to use this “strong stone house” as a fort. 
Repairs were made, and the building was christened Fort 
Bowman, the Revolution’s westernmost American fort. 
In addition, the local militia was mustered into American 
service.12 Having settled military matters, Bowman turned 
to civil affairs. He organized a local court, and he was 
elected its first president. This court met in the home of 
Francois Saucier; the building was later purchased by St. 
Clair County to serve as the first county courthouse in 
the first county of what became the State of Illinois. The 
building still stands, and it is open to the public as the 
Cahokia Courthouse State Historic Site.13  
 Most of the Illinois French had indeed swung to the 
Patriot cause. Now Clark had to come to terms with the 
various First Nations of the Mid-Mississippi Valley and 
surrounding areas. Many of these tribes began to gather 
at Cahokia to treat with Clark and his Big Knives. A 
conference between Clark and the Indians at Cahokia was 
organized in August. The location of these discussions 
was more than likely near Fort Bowman. Indeed, we know 
that many Indians were camped at the eastern end of the 
Cahokia Wedge before and during their meetings with 
Clark.14
 Regardless of the exact location, the “amazing 
number” of assembled Indians significantly outnumbered 
Clark and his small force.15 Clark once again used 
psychology to compensate for a lack of troops. The 
American commander stressed that he was seeking neither 
peace nor war, but instead desired to know which of the 
two the Indians intended. He emphasized that he respected 
them as men and as warriors, and as such expected them to 
speak truthfully and live by whichever decision they made. 
But he also emphasized that the British had misled the 
Indians regarding both the Americans’ and London’s true 
intentions. Clark maintained that Americans only wanted 
the freedom to govern themselves, while the British were 
using the various tribes to fight their war for them. Clark’s 
credibility was supported by the Spanish. “The friendly 
correspondence between the Spaniards and ourselves was 
also much to our advantage, since everything the Indians 
heard from them was favorable to us,” Clark wrote in his 
memoir.16 
 This combination of bluff, bravado, respect, appeal to 
self interest, and Spanish support worked. Despite a failed 
attempt by some Indians to kidnap him, Clark’s conference 
was a great success. During the five weeks he spent at 
Cahokia, the American commander negotiated peace with 
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at least ten of the First Nations that were represented there. 
These peace agreements neutralized a large number of 
potential British recruits.17 The local Illinois French largely 
supported the Patriot cause, and now many Indians swore 
peace and neutrality. Clark’s success with these two groups 
was mirrored by his success with a third important player 
in the Mid-Mississippi Valley: Spain.  
Spanish-American Contacts & Relations
 Clark’s intelligence from St. Louis proved accurate. 
Local Spanish officials were indeed sympathetic to Clark 
and his army. “Our friends, the Spanyards, [did] everything 
in their power to convince me of their friendship,” Clark 
wrote to a friend.18 This was especially true of the Spanish 
Lt. Gov. Fernando de Leyba. Immediately following 
Bowman’s successful occupation of Cahokia, de Leyba 
sent him a message of congratulations and welcome. He 
also wrote a similar letter to Clark in Kaskaskia. Clark 
responded to de Leyba with a July 13 letter in which he 
expressed his thanks and hope for continued friendship 
between Americans and Spaniards: “Dear Sir, I received 
your letter of the 8th Instant and with pleasure read the 
contints wherein you expressed the deepest sentiments 
of your real Friendship to me and the American Cause 
a Friendship that is valuable to us. We have already 
The Revolutionary War in the trans-Appalachian West was marked by skirmishes between smaller forces and Native 
Americans whom the British convinced to side with them against the Americans, as this map suggests. (Image: Albert 
Bushnell, The American Nation, vol. 14, 1906)
Clark was known as the “Hannibal of the West” by the end 
of the Revolutionary War, and he remained a heroic figure, 
as is seen by his commemoration on this stamp marking the 
150th anniversary of his victory at Vincennes. (Image: U.S. 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing)
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experienced it and hope to Merit a Continuation thereof.” 
He was especially grateful for de Leyba’s “treatment to 
Captain Bowman and Speaches to the Savages in favour of 
us.”19  
 These letters were the beginning of an important 
working relationship between the Americans and Spanish 
in the Mid-Mississippi Valley. This relationship was 
described in an April 23, 1779, letter from de Leyba to 
Patrick Henry: “From the time that my friend Colonel 
Clark arrived in this place, fraternal harmony has reigned 
between the people from the United States and the 
vassals of his Catholic Majesty.”20 And as Clark wrote 
in his memoir, “Friendly correspondence which at once 
commenced between the Spanish officers and ourselves 
added much to the general tranquility and happiness.”21 
This friendship was especially true of Clark and de Leyba 
themselves. Clark was a frequent guest of de Leyba in 
St. Louis, and a close working relationship between 
the two was forged by these visits and a continuous 
correspondence.
 Spanish friendship though was also very much 
based on Spanish interests. Even before Clark and his 
army arrived in the Illinois Country, the Spanish were 
considering their options vis-à-vis the British Empire. 
The British had held Gibraltar since 1713, and they had 
taken Majorca in the Mediterranean and Florida in North 
America as a result of the late French and Indian War. 
Spanish calculations in the Mississippi Valley were but 
one part of a much larger Spanish strategy. The goal of 
that strategy was to return those lost lands to Spain and 
to expand Spain’s position in the Mississippi Valley.22 
During the late 1770s and early 1780s, this goal meshed 
reasonably well with the American goal of independence. 
Bernardo de Galvez, Spanish Governor of Louisiana, 
instructed de Leyba to assist Clark as much as possible, 
but in secret. He also allowed Oliver Pollock, purchasing 
agent for both the Continental Congress and Virginia 
in New Orleans, to conduct his operations in Spanish 
territory freely. Of course, neither act was in keeping with 
Spain’s official position of neutrality.23 
 Clark’s ultimate goal was to take Detroit. It was the 
most important British post in the West, and it served as a 
garrison town, supply depot, and meeting place for British 
officers and their Indian allies. Clark believed that if he 
could take Detroit, he could largely neutralize British 
efforts in the western theater of the war. However, Clark’s 
plans for a strike at Detroit were subordinated to the need 
to expel the British from Fort Sackville, which the British 
had retaken in December of 1778. Clark’s expedition to 
Vincennes included many Cahokia residents who were 
eager to remove the British from Fort Sackville, and thus 
remove a major threat to their community. 
 Once Vincennes was back in American hands, Clark 
again planned an expedition against Detroit. As he did 
before his move into the Illinois Country, Clark sought 
to gather intelligence on the lands he intended to enter. 
To that end, he ordered Capt. Godefroy Linctot to take 
his company of Cahokia volunteers north and scout the 
Illinois River Valley and beyond. In a June 1779 letter to 
Linctot, Clark ordered him “to take Charge of a Volunteer 
Company raised at Cahos and march by way of the Illinois 
River to the British post Called Ome (on the Miami 
River) which I make no doubt but that you can easily get 
possession of by which Means you probably may be safe 
while you have an opportunity of treating with the Indians 
in that Quarter. . . .”24 Unfortunately for Clark, the British 
were planning offensive operations of their own. 
Battle of Ft. San Carlos
 Spain’s entry into the war in 1779 added another 
factor to British strategic planning in the trans-
Appalachian West. While still a major European power, 
Spain’s resources in this particular theater of the war 
were quite limited. Very few troops from the Louisiana 
Regiment were stationed in Upper Louisiana, leaving 
defense primarily to local militia, and the Spanish fort at 
the mouth of the Missouri River was literally falling down. 
In this 1804 scene of St. Louis as it appeared from Illinois, Fort San Carlos can be seen in the center.  (Image: Missouri 
History Museum)
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Further, the Spanish had been assisting Clark and his men 
since their arrival in 1778, but the official peace between 
Great Britain and Spain had limited the British response. 
Now, with war officially declared, the British could reduce 
if not eliminate Spanish assistance to the rebels, as well as 
force open the rich fur trade of the Missouri River Valley, 
long closed to British traders by Spanish regulations.25 
The attack on St. Louis and Cahokia was thus part of a 
multipronged offensive planned to sweep through the 
Mississippi Valley. The timing could not have been better 
for the British or worse for the Allies. The British had 
spent considerable time courting various First Nations, 
and as a result they could recruit hundreds of warriors to 
their colors. Conversely, Spanish and American forces 
in the Mississippi Valley were weak and spread thinly 
among various forts and settlements. Further, Clark was 
preoccupied with building Fort Jefferson. Located on the 
Mississippi River south of the Ohio, Clark planned to 
concentrate what troops he did have at the new post once 
it was complete. Both Spanish forces in St. Louis and 
American forces in Cahokia would have to rely on local 
Illinois French militia to flesh out their thin ranks.26  
 Further, the “Hard Winter” of 1779–1780 was the 
most severe in years. Ice and snow covered much of the 
country from the Great Lakes to Virginia. Game became 
scarce, livestock died, and food stores dwindled. Both 
civilians and soldiers suffered during these bitterly cold 
months. The only benefit of this severe weather was that 
it curtailed the military activities of the British and their 
Indian allies.27
 But while the British were relatively quiet in the West, 
they were shifting their primary focus of the war in the 
East to the southern states, including Virginia. This meant 
that the Old Dominion had even fewer resources to send 
west as it faced British troops in the east. In New Orleans, 
Oliver Pollock had gone bankrupt trying to supply Clark, 
and he could no longer support the small American force 
in the Mississippi Valley. Clark’s army was cold and short 
of supplies, and desertion was becoming a problem.28  
 Unhappily for the British, these advantages were 
negated by one major disadvantage: the loss of the element 
of surprise. Word of the impending attack reached St. 
Louis and Cahokia long before the British attack force 
arrived. This gave the Allies time to prepare their defenses. 
Col. John Montgomery, American military commander 
in the Illinois Country, responded to the situation 
as best he could. In a May 15, 1780, letter to Clark, 
Montgomery stated that “the Bad nues . . . Compelled 
Me to March with out loss of Time to the asistance of the 
inhabetents of Kaho. . . .” Luckily for Montgomery, his 
small force included many “inhabetents of Kaho [w]ho 
have Digtinguished them Selves More like Vetrons than 
ondesiplened men and are Redy to turn out to a man to Go 
Any Where the[y] are Requested.”29 Despite the skill and 
reliability of his Cahokia militia, if Montgomery stood 
a chance of successfully defending the village he would 
have to be reinforced before the hammer fell. Some help 
did come in early May when Capt. John Rogers arrived 
with a company of mounted Virginians. Rogers and his 
men made repairs to Fort Bowman and “Put it in Some 
Poster of Defence.”30   
 As the situation worsened, Cahokia appealed to 
Clark, now a full colonel, for assistance. The Board of 
Magistrates sent Charles Gratiot, a Swiss-born Cahokia 
resident and prominent merchant, to present Clark with a 
letter dated April 11 in which the magistrates explained the 
village’s desperate situation: “We are on the eve of being 
attacked in our village by considerable parties of savages 
and will not be able to work at the cultivation of our 
fields, if we do not have prompt succor. . . .” Their letter 
also reflected the “Hard Winter” as they went on to write, 
“but what afflicts us the most is this, that in case you send 
us many men, we should not have the provisions which 
would be necessary for them. . . .”31 One the signatories of 
this letter was Pierre Martin, whose house still stands in 
Prairie du Pont just south of Cahokia. In a May 11, 1780, 
letter to Oliver Pollock, Clark reflected on the gravity of 
the situation: “The Illenois Settlement are much threatened 
by the British Gentlemen at Detroit. . . .”32 
 On May 15, Montgomery and Rogers crossed the 
Col. John Montgomery (c. 1750–1794) served with George 
Rogers Clark in the Illinois Country in the War of American 
Independence. Montgomery came by his revolutionary 
credentials honestly; he was one of the 13 signers of the 
Fincastle Resolutions, in which the elected representatives of 
Fincastle County, Virginia Colony, told Virginia’s delegation 
to the First Continental Congress of their support of breaking 
with the British Crown in January 1775. (Image: Nashville 
CivicScope)
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Mississippi from Cahokia to St. Louis to confer with de 
Leyba on how to respond to the threat with a combined 
and coherent strategy. Perhaps reflecting Clark’s tactical 
thinking, Montgomery suggested that the Allies strike first. 
De Leyba agreed, promising Spanish support for such a 
campaign. However, the American delay in obtaining boats 
and provisions for the expedition resulted in the attack on 
St. Louis and Cahokia occurring before Montgomery was 
able to move.33    
 The British force that attacked Cahokia and St. Louis 
on May 26, 1780, was composed primarily of warriors 
from various First Nations and commanded by Emmanuel 
Hesse. In a February 17, 1780, letter to his superiors, 
Michilimackinac Lt. Gov. Patrick Sinclair described 
Hesse as “a Trader and a man of character (formerly in the 
60th Regt). . . .”34 Thus Hesse was familiar with Britain’s 
Indian allies and frontier warfare, and he was deemed 
reliable. The Indians he commanded largely came from 
the Sauk and Fox, Menominee, Winnebago, and Ojibwe 
nations. Hesse and his force left Michilimackinac on 
March 10 and moved south to Prairie du Chien. There 
Hesse recruited more men. On May 2, Hesse and his force 
of approximately 1,000 left Prairie du Chien and headed 
south toward St. Louis and Cahokia.35 
 Both Montgomery and de Leyba sent dispatches to 
Clark requesting that he leave Fort Jefferson and march 
north to aid in the defense of Cahokia and St. Louis. Clark 
arrived in Cahokia on May 25, and he immediately crossed 
the Mississippi River to confer with de Leyba in St. Louis. 
Afterwards, he returned to Cahokia to supervise its defense 
against approximately 300 warriors led by Jean Marie 
Ducharme.36 
 There is precious little in the primary sources which 
describes the fighting at Cahokia. One such document 
is a letter from Montgomery to the Honorable Board of 
Commissioners for the Settlement of Western Accounts 
dated February 22, 1783. In it, Montgomery gives a brief 
description of events:
In the Spring of 1780, we were threatened with 
an Invasion. Genl: Clark [promoted in 1781] 
being informed of it Hurreyed his departure with 
a small body of troops to the Falls of the mouth 
of the Ohio, when he received other expresses 
from the Spanish Comm’dts and myself, luckily 
joined me at Cohos, time enough to save the 
country from Impending ruin, as the Enimy 
appeared in great force within twenty-four hours 
after his arrival. Finding that they were likely to 
be disappointed in their Design, they retired after 
doing some mischief on the Span’h shore, . . .37
In a September 1780 letter, the Cahokians themselves 
described how the Indians’ “slack manner of making war” 
resulted in little “carnage in our country.”38 
 While Clark’s force and the residents of Cahokia did 
not suffer the losses that St. Louis did, there were losses 
nonetheless. According to a July 8, 1780, letter by Sinclair, 
“The Rebels lost an officer and three men killed at the 
Cahokias & five Prisoners.”39  With the fighting at Cahokia 
and St. Louis over, the Indian force retreated north. The 
Mississippi Valley component of the British offensive 
collapsed. Soon, the entire offensive ground to a halt. Once 
it had, Clark again turned his attention to Detroit. Included 
in his calculations was the possible inclusion of Spanish 
troops in such a campaign. 
Spanish-American
Combined Operations
 After successfully defending Cahokia, Clark returned 
to Fort Jefferson. Before leaving, he issued orders to 
Montgomery to counterattack the Indians who had just 
attacked Cahokia. Specifically, Montgomery was to pursue 
the retreating Indians, degrade that force when and where 
possible, and destroy the primary Sauk and Fox towns. 
Montgomery’s force of approximately 350 men contained 
Cahokia militia as well as 100 Spanish troops, making this 
an Allied offensive. The resulting Rock River Expedition 
illustrated that Spanish and American commanders 
could cooperate on offensive as well as on defensive 
operations.40 
 Describing the expedition in a September 21, 1780, 
letter to Augustin Mottin de la Balme, a former French 
officer who claimed to act on behalf of the King of France, 
the “Inhabitants of Cahokia” recounted the beginning of 
the campaign: “Oh, Colonel Clark, affecting always to 
desire our public welfare and under pretext of avenging 
us, soon formed with us conjointly with the Spaniards a 
party of more than three hundred men to go and attack in 
their own village the savages who had come to our homes 
to harass us, and after substituting Colonel Montgomery to 
command in his place, he soon left us.”41
 Montgomery wrote that after receiving his instructions 
from Clark, he “immediately proceeded to the Business I 
was order’d and march’d three hundred and fifty men to 
the Lake open on the Illinois River, and from thence to the 
Rock River, Destroying the Towns and crops proposed, the 
Enimy not daring to fight. . . .”42
 While Montgomery seemed satisfied with the 
campaign’s outcome, the Cahokians’ experience in the 
Rock River Expedition must have left something to be 
desired. In the same letter to Mottin de la Balme quoted 
above, the “Inhabitants of Cahokia” described in detail the 
shortcomings of the Anglo-American forces: “It is then, 
well to explain to you, sir, that the Virginians, who never 
employed any principle of economy, have been the cause 
by their lack of management and bad conduct, of the non-
success of the expedition and that our glorious projects 
have failed through their fault: for the savages abandoned 
their nearest villages, where we have been, and we were 
forced to stop and not push on further, since we had almost 
no more provisions, powder, balls, which the Virginians 
had undertaken to furnish us.”43 This letter again illustrates 
the independence of thought and opinion that characterized 
the residents of Cahokia.
 But the unsatisfactory experience with the Rock River 
campaign, organized and commanded by Americans, did 
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not deter Cahokians from cooperating with their neighbors 
to the west. Spanish troops and Cahokia militia cooperated 
in patrolling the areas north of Cahokia and St. Louis. In 
August 1780, these patrols repulsed an Indian probe into 
their area of operations.44 
 Cahokians also joined an expedition led by Mottin de 
la Balme. The goal of his expedition north was to attack 
Detroit. If Clark and his Virginians could not achieve 
this, then perhaps this representative of the former mother 
country could. Mottin de la Balme and his mixed force of 
Illinois French and Indians got as far as the headwaters of 
the Maumee River where the Frenchman and most of his 
troops were killed by Miami warriors. Before his death, 
Mottin de la Balme had detached a small force of Cahokia 
French to attack the British post at St. Joseph, modern-day 
Niles, Michigan. Their attack was successful, and the post 
was destroyed. But the Cahokians themselves were then 
attacked by a party of British traders and Potawatomi.  
Only three of them returned home.45 This defeat moved 
the residents of Cahokia to strike at St. Joseph once again. 
However, the new expedition would include their allies 
from across the river. 
 In St. Louis, Lt. Gov. Francisco Cruzat, who had 
replaced the deceased de Leyba in September 1780, 
authorized a Spanish expedition against St. Joseph. 
He appointed Capt. Eugenio Pierra (Eugene Pourré) to 
organize and command this campaign. Pierra raised a 
mixed force of 65 Spanish militia, 60 Indians, and 20 
Cahokia French. Pierra and his men left St. Louis on 
January 2, 1781, and arrived at St. Joseph on the 12th. Only 
a few British traders and Indians were present, and the 
Spanish-led force had no difficulty taking the post. Pierra 
and his men wasted little time in destroying St. Joseph 
and returning to St. Louis.46 Ominously for the future of 
Spanish-American relations, Pierra raised the Spanish flag 
over the post and claimed the region for Spain.
Conclusion
 Pierra’s action at St. Joseph foreshadowed over a 
century of Spanish-American rivalry that stretched from 
the Mississippi Valley to South America.47 However, 
Spanish-American cooperation during the Revolutionary 
War, especially at the Battle of Fort San Carlos, secured 
the Northwest Territory and a Mississippi River boundary 
for the new nation when peace finally came in 1783. 
 Clark’s successful campaign in the trans-Appalachian 
West was in large part made possible by Spanish assistance 
and cooperation. Like the French in the East, the Spanish 
in the West were of critical importance in securing 
American victory. Spanish supplies, Spanish troops, and 
Spanish diplomatic support with the Indians not only 
enabled Clark and his small army to successfully occupy 
and defend the old French villages of Cahokia, Vincennes, 
and Kaskaskia, but also to use them as staging areas to 
strike at the British and their First Nation allies further 
north.  
 Of particular importance to Clark was the financing 
of his army and its operations. This was largely done by 
Oliver Pollock in New Orleans. Pollock used his personal 
wealth as collateral for purchases of Spanish goods made 
by Virginia and the United States. But it was Pollock’s 
personal connections to Spanish officials, including 
governors, which made these purchases possible. In an 
April 22, 1788, letter to Pollock, William Heth stated: 
“There is no circumstance of which I am more convinced 
than that the conquest of the Illinois country could not 
have been maintained by Virginia and that consequently 
that it would not now form part of the United States 
if it had not been for your assistance and very liberal 
advances.”48 Heth was one of three commissioners 
appointed to sort out the debts owed to New Orleans 
merchants contracted by Pollock on behalf of Virginia 
and Congress. Pollock’s personal wealth and connections 
served Clark and the Patriot cause in the West extremely 
well. 
 The role of Cahokia and its people in the western 
theater of the Revolutionary War was also important. 
Cahokia was the site of Clark’s Indian conference that 
bought precious months of peace which enabled the 
Americans to secure their position in the Illinois County. 
The village’s location near St. Louis enabled American 
commanders to maintain regular contact with their Spanish 
allies. Officers stationed at Fort Bowman in Cahokia 
were often in St. Louis conferring with their Spanish 
counterparts. Cahokia’s location also made it an ideal spot 
from which to launch operations to the north, and to act 
as a shield for the villages further south. The people of 
Cahokia themselves gave valuable service to the Patriot 
cause and the Allied war effort by fighting in several 
engagements and under a variety of commanders: the 
American Clark, the Frenchman Mottin de la Balme, and 
the Spaniard Pierra.   
 It was also at Cahokia, and St. Louis, that the 
Americans, Spanish, and the Illinois French broke the 
grand British offensive of 1780. The Battle of Fort San 
Carlos left British operations in the West in shambles. The 
war wound down and ended before another attempt could 
be made to drive the Americans and the Spanish from the 
Mississippi Valley. This in turn left Virginia and the United 
States in possession of the lands between the Appalachian 
Mountains and the Mississippi River. Though their actual 
control of these lands was tenuous, Clark’s western 
campaign and his defense of Cahokia on May 26, 1780, 
gave the United States the ability to successfully press 
its claims to this territory during peace negotiations with 
the British. Virginia governor Benjamin Harrison testified 
to this in a July 2, 1783, letter to Clark: “[M]y thanks 
and those of my Council for the very great and singular 
services you have rendered your Country, in wresting so 
great and valuable a territory out of the hands of the British 
Enemy, repelling the attacks of their savage allies, and 
carrying on successful war in the heart of their country.”49 
Thus, in conjunction with his Spanish allies and with the 
aid of the village and people of Cahokia, George Rogers 
Clark and his army of “Big Knives” secured an America 
not bound to the Atlantic seaboard.  
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Gateway Liberalism:
Catholic and Jewish Responses
to Racially Transitioning Neighborhoods
and Schools In St. Louis’s West End,
1945–1960
S A R A H  S I E G E L
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Within the span of one year, two civil rights decisions, 
one religious and one secular, signaled momentous shifts 
in the racial and religious demographics of St. Louis’s 
schools and neighborhoods. In the summer of 1947, St. 
Louis’s newly arrived Cardinal Joseph Ritter announced 
that the city and county’s Catholic high schools would 
desegregate.1 A few months later, in January 1948, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled racially restrictive 
housing covenants illegal in the St. Louis–based Shelley 
v. Kraemer case. For decades, racial covenants had forced 
a growing black population to remain in overcrowded, 
segregated neighborhoods, and as a result of the case, 
blacks gradually moved into previously all-white 
neighborhoods across the city and north county. 
These two decisions, imposed upon St. Louisans by 
authority figures, sparked rapid and intense demographic 
change in schools and neighborhoods. The area most 
affected by housing desegregation was the West End 
neighborhood, a working- and middle-class community 
located on the northwestern border of the city. In the 
decade following these two decisions, the West End 
specifically and St. Louis as a whole rose to be a model 
of progressive race relations that quickly faltered. Buoyed 
by an initially lauded school desegregation process, West 
End activists worked hard to stabilize their neighborhood’s 
interracial composition by publicizing the neighborhood 
as a model of an integrated, desirable, middle-class 
community. 
As the decisions of 1947–1948 signaled clear change 
in the city’s population patterns, a broad range of St. 
Louisans exhibited optimism regarding the future of 
race relations in the city. This confidence was especially 
apparent in the way the city’s press portrayed St. 
Louis’s response to the Brown v. Board public school 
desegregation case. When the Brown decision was 
announced in May 1954, local news articles distanced 
the city from the turmoil the case caused in the South. On 
the day of the court’s announcement, the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch foresaw that the decision “will cause the most 
radical upheaval in the South since reconstruction days,” 
yet a day later, the city’s NAACP branch also correctly 
predicted “that no difficulty will be experienced because 
of integrated education [in St. Louis]. … All people have 
a profound respect for the laws of the land.”2 Even though 
the Brown case deemed Missouri’s school segregation laws 
illegal alongside those of the South, the city reported the 
decision as if residents were northern onlookers. In fact, 
St. Louis’s newspapers usually took a nonchalant tone 
regarding the city’s school desegregation to highlight its 
lack of controversy. The press also declined to give much 
publicity to anti-integration protest, choosing instead to 
focus on the logistics of the desegregation plan. 3 The 
Post-Dispatch, the Globe-Democrat, and the black-owned 
Argus described the three desegregation phases planned by 
the school board, announced each stage of implementation, 
and reported the number black students who transferred 
to each previously all-white school. They provided quotes 
from school administrators who praised students for 
adapting quickly to their new peers.4 Overall, Missouri’s 
desegregation process received surprisingly little attention 
from the press, and St. Louisans prided themselves on their 
peaceful, law-abiding citizenry that seemed, for the most 
part, accepting of progressive change.
Certainly, some ardent and vocal segregationists 
expressed their anger at desegregation. Most notably, 
an organization called the National Citizens Protective 
Association organized briefly to express opposition to 
the desegregation plan. Many others surely expressed 
disapproval of segregation privately, and a minority of 
parents instructed their children not to associate with 
black classmates socially, telling their children to “just 
act like [the black students] are not there.”5 But public 
school desegregation plans in St. Louis were implemented 
without violence or widespread opposition and with the 
support of a variety of community institutions, especially 
civil rights, interfaith, and neighborhood organizations.6 
In some cases, parents organized to ease their children’s 
schools’ integration. They expressed their enthusiasm 
that desegregation strengthened the city’s commitment to 
equality and democracy, and their views were accepted 
as mainstream.7 At the time it was implemented in 1954–
1955, civil rights groups and liberal whites largely hailed 
the integration process as a victory. Indeed, the St. Louis 
Joseph Ritter (1892–1967) had already taken action to 
desegregate Catholic schools before he arrived in St. Louis 
as archbishop in 1947.  As the new Bishop of Indianapolis 
in 1938, Ritter ordered that parochial schools no longer be 
segregated, which met with opposition and protests from 
groups as varied as the Ku Klux Klan and some clergy.  
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)
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Board of Education had completed its desegregation plan 
on schedule by September 1955, just over a year after the 
Brown decision and two years before the federally forced 
desegregation of Central High in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
City leaders, school officials, residents, and news outlets 
touted St. Louis as a law-abiding community willing to 
actively facilitate, or at least passively accept, integration. 
Despite this tranquil picture, the recently desegregated 
schools and racially transitioning neighborhoods in St. 
Louis fell prey to re-segregation within only a few years, 
and this racial and economic segregation has persisted to 
the present day. There were instances in the late fifties and 
early sixties of the school board allowing white students to 
attend white schools outside of their neighborhood districts 
through loopholes and busing, but overall re-segregation 
occurred due to racial change within city and county 
neighborhoods. Less than ten years after this purported 
triumph of school integration and racial progressivism, 
school and neighborhood desegregation had all but 
disappeared, and St. Louis became yet another example of 
the devastating shortcomings of liberal racial policies.
Why did a city that acted so confidently to end legalized 
school segregation overwhelmingly fail to sustain 
integrated urban schools and neighborhoods? The answer 
lies in the contradictions of liberalism, both in St. Louis 
and throughout the country. Historian Robert Self defines 
liberalism with four factors: a general commitment to 
New Deal welfare institutions, the economic promotion 
of the middle class, equality of opportunity for all races, 
and individualism.8 As Self has explained, a central pitfall 
of liberalism in the mid-twentieth century was that when 
white liberals’ commitment to racial equality clashed 
with their commitment to expanded opportunity for the 
middle class, they almost always favored benefiting the 
middle class to the detriment of black economic, political, 
and housing opportunities. White liberals’ desire to live 
and own property in upwardly mobile communities 
ultimately trumped visions of interracial neighborhoods. 
Self provides a crucial explanation for where goals 
of liberalism fall apart, but it is necessary to analyze 
local cases to understand why this breakdown of liberal 
ideology occurred and what its consequences were.
Two distinct but related types of liberalism were present 
in St. Louis, though both failed to create a coherent vision 
of an urban community that was both integrated and 
economically prosperous. A small but vocal cohort of 
active liberals understood that maintaining an integrated 
urban neighborhood would require individuals to make 
housing choices based on a desire to foster an integrated 
community. They understood that pursuing economic 
advancement and racial integration simultaneously would 
require a personal commitment. They joined interracial 
neighborhood organizations with the goal of fostering an 
integrated, economically stable neighborhood. As large 
numbers of their neighbors disinvested in the city and 
moved to the suburbs, however, active liberals realized that 
their agenda would be incredibly difficult to implement. 
Organizations that promoted neighborhood advancement 
experienced interracial disagreements, inhibiting their 
moral authority. Further, active white liberals never had a 
critical mass to influence demographic patterns. Despite a 
more realistic understanding of what it would take to craft 
an integrated neighborhood, active liberals were unable to 
sustain an interracial community. 
In addition to a small number of active liberals, the 
majority of whites in the West End were what can be 
called passive liberals: they believed in both economic 
opportunity and racial equality, but were unwilling to take 
any actions that would risk their financial security. To be a 
passive liberal does not mean that these individuals were 
unwilling to act; in fact, these individuals were quick to 
leave the neighborhood when they sensed the possibility 
of economic decline. These individuals assumed that an 
influx of black residents would decrease property values, 
and they chose to leave the West End (sometimes even 
before blacks started moving into the neighborhood) rather 
than risk living in a declining community. Passive liberals 
could feel secure that their race-based decisions were not 
racist because they espoused the rhetoric of racial equality. 
The term “passive” therefore refers to the nature of their 
commitment to liberalism: they believed that individuals 
should not be responsible for personally participating in 
residential desegregation. Passive liberalism could only 
improve race relations when a community would endorse 
policies that were becoming mainstream, as was the 
case in St. Louis’s public school desegregation.9 Passive 
liberalism failed to produce improvements for blacks when 
whites perceived personal financial or social risks, seen 
in whites’ housing choices in the late 1940s through the 
1950s. While this passive liberalism may seem innocuous 
on its surface, it had pernicious consequences that have 
maintained economic and racial segregation into the 
twenty-first century. Most insidious, as passive liberalism 
became the mainstream in the West End, individuals 
could espouse liberal rhetoric while justifying race-based 
decisions about where to live and with whom to socialize.
To better understand racially transitioning 
neighborhoods, urban scholars have examined the religious 
influences within cities, which in many cases had profound 
effects on urban policy and neighborhood demographics. 
Attention to religious population patterns is especially 
important in heavily Catholic St Louis and in the West 
End, which had a large Jewish population. Even though 
the character of liberalism was different for Catholics 
and Jews, the effects of liberalism were similar on each 
group’s housing choices. As evidenced by Cardinal 
Ritter’s decision to desegregate parochial schools, Catholic 
leadership in St. Louis proved much more actively liberal 
than the general population. Parishioners therefore often 
felt caught between their religious devotion to the Catholic 
hierarchy and their social anxiety about living in close 
proximity to blacks. This tension between mandates from 
Catholic religious leaders and discomfort with integrated 
communities translated into a grudging acceptance of 
passive liberalism. It led to the existence of integrated 
institutions and a simultaneous exodus into racially 
homogenous suburbs.10 Even though Jewish laypeople 
were more likely than Catholics to espouse liberal rhetoric, 
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most Jews’ commitments to racial equality and integration 
were also passive—they were ultimately unwilling to take 
any action that posed economic or social risk in order to 
cultivate a desirable, integrated urban neighborhood.11 
For Jews in the West End, the problem with liberalism 
was a gap between rhetoric and action. Passive liberals 
accepted desegregated institutions but proved unwilling 
to commit to active pursuance of an integrated, desirable 
neighborhood.
St. Louisans’ understanding of the necessity and 
inevitability of school integration opened unique 
opportunities for residents to lead integration, and many 
of these efforts had religious influences. Despite efforts 
by some religious and secular leaders, though, St. Louis 
missed its opportunity for a truly integrated city because a 
majority of passively liberal residents and religious leaders 
could not reconcile their theoretical commitment to racial 
equality with personal choices regarding where to live and 
educate their children. Highlighting Catholic and Jewish 
experiences with school and neighborhood desegregation 
demonstrates these complex dynamics. Regardless of 
who spearheaded campaigns to promote integration—
The YMHA/YWHA sponsored a Liberal Forum in the 1940s and 1950s that featured a number of speakers who were 
prominent nationally.  Among those was Max Lerner (1902–1992), a Russian immigrant who became a popular journalist, 
editor, and scholar.  By the time he spoke at the Liberal Forum in St. Louis, he was well known for advocating rights for 
African-Americans, as well as supporting internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. (Image: St. Louis Jewish 
Community Archives)
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institutionally based Catholic leaders, individual liberal 
Jewish leaders, or secular interracial neighborhood 
organizations—the results were similar: between 1945 and 
1960, most whites moved out of neighborhoods that began 
integrating after 1948. 
St. Louis’s West End neighborhood typifies the city’s 
racial transition and failed efforts to create stable, middle-
class, integrated urban spaces. The West End is located 
north of Forest Park, extending west to the city limits, 
east to Kingshighway Boulevard, one of the city’s central 
arteries, and north approximately to Natural Bridge Road. 
The West End bordered African American residential 
enclaves, making it a logical place for blacks to move 
after the Shelley v. Kraemer decision. The neighborhood’s 
Windemere Place was the first block of the city to 
desegregate in the wake of the court decision.12 Individuals 
who lived in the West End in the first half of the twentieth 
century remember it fondly. Harvey Brown, a Jewish 
West End resident from 1937–1950, explained, “it was a 
wonderful place to grow up, and we had everything we 
needed. . . . [W]e had so many places to go to play.”13 
The West End was home to two Catholic parishes that 
flourished during the early twentieth century: St. Rose of 
Lima and St. Mark. Adjacent to the neighborhood lies the 
Cathedral Basilica of St. Louis, the spiritual center of the 
archdiocese of St. Louis. A variety of Jewish congregations 
also inhabited the neighborhood through the first half 
of the century. Most of these synagogues had relocated 
to the West End from locations in or near downtown, 
following a population shift as the Jewish community 
grew, prospered economically, and moved west. Even 
though racial transition was occurring by the early fifties, 
the West End still boasted at least fourteen separate Jewish 
congregations in 1954.14 While many Catholic children 
attended parochial schools, most Jews sent their children 
to public school. Soldan High School (for a brief period 
known as Soldan-Blewett), located on Union Boulevard in 
the heart of the West End, housed a large Jewish student 
body from its construction in 1909 until after World 
War II and was a source of pride for the neighborhood. 
In fact, Jewish alumnae and their families continue to 
refer to the school and the prominent place it once had 
for their community. Analyzing Catholic, Jewish, and 
secular responses to school and neighborhood integration 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of St. Louis’s liberalism.  
There is a very strong Catholic influence on the St. 
Louis region. St. Louis today has a higher proportion of 
Catholics attending parochial schools than any diocese 
in the country.15 As Cardinal Joseph Ritter’s 1947 school 
desegregation indicated, the liberal Catholic impulse 
to embrace integrated schools and neighborhoods was 
rooted in Catholic leadership and institutions. While some 
Catholic St. Louisians supported school and neighborhood 
integration, a large portion resented incoming blacks. 
Clergy, recognizing that fixed parish boundaries would 
suffer great population losses if white Catholics abandoned 
their parishes, worked to convince white Catholics to 
remain in their parishes and also sometimes to convert 
Temple Israel was among the religious institutions at the “Holy Corners” area in the Central West End at the intersection of 
Kingshighway and McPherson, and it was the synagogue for the large Jewish population in the West End.  (Image: St. Louis 
Jewish Community Archives)
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blacks to Catholicism. These efforts, both to keep white 
Catholics in the city and to convert blacks, were largely 
unsuccessful. The post–World War II years witnessed a 
substantial decline of the Catholic population in St. Louis 
city, and many urban parishes—including those in and 
near the West End—had to be closed or consolidated in 
the late twentieth century due to a decreasing Catholic 
population.
By the early twentieth century, the vast majority of 
the Catholic population in St. Louis was white. Black 
Catholics, whose population had French Creole roots, 
worshiped in the segregated St. Elizabeth Parish, and 
many sent their children to St. Joseph’s Colored High 
School. However, Cardinal Ritter’s 1947 announcement 
that all Catholic high schools would desegregate was 
a reaction to the inadequate resources at St. Joseph’s. 
His actively liberal proclamation provoked a variety of 
responses from both Catholics and non-Catholics, and 
correspondence poured into the Archdiocese from St. 
Louis, across the country, and places as remote as Mexico 
and Bangalore. The vast majority of the letters—402 
out of 479—expressed approval of Cardinal Ritter’s 
actions.16 They applauded his courageous declaration and 
implored him not to let segregationists change his mind. 
One approving citizen wrote, “it is difficult to see how the 
Church’s mission to men of all races and nationalities can 
be fulfilled in the United States without some bold action 
such as your own.”17 
Those who disapproved also sent emotional letters. 
They cited many reasons—personal, economic, political, 
and racial—for disapproving of the Cardinal’s actions. 
They expressed outrage that stemmed from fears of 
miscegenation, worry that black people had bad odor, 
frustration that the money white Catholics donated to the 
Archdiocese was being used to help undeserving blacks, 
and a belief that Cardinal Ritter’s unilateral action was 
reminiscent of Hitler’s totalitarianism. Some stated that 
they refused to send their children to integrated institutions 
and intended to transfer their children to other schools, 
with one individual stating, “all I can say is thank God 
for our Public Schools.”18 Still others referred to the city’s 
southern connections, explaining to the Cardinal that “St. 
Louis has always been a pro-Southern city, and I think we 
have handled the racial problem to our advantage, so why 
should the Catholic Church be the first to initiate such a 
drastic flaw?”19 One woman even claimed she no longer 
St. Mark’s Church quickly became a large and prominent Catholic congregation by the start of 
the twentieth century.  This building at Page and Academy avenues, designed by the prominent 
architectural firm of Barnett, Haynes, and Barnett, was completed in 1902.  The school was nearby. 
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)
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wanted to be Catholic.20 The reasoning in the disapproving 
letters ranged from desires to maintain the status quo to 
overt racial hatred. 
It is impossible to tell whether the majority of St. Louis’s 
Catholic population approved or disapproved of Catholic 
school integration solely by analyzing letters sent to 
Cardinal Ritter. Comparing the number of supportive and 
opposing letters sent does little good because many people 
who personally disapproved of the Cardinal’s actions 
were probably unwilling to voice their dissenting opinions 
directly to the Cardinal. What is clear, though, is that 
many Catholics in St. Louis were deeply disconcerted by 
the contradictions between their personal racial views and 
their Cardinal’s liberalism. Other pieces of evidence from 
the months and years after Cardinal Ritter’s announcement 
provide clues to how the community adjusted to integrated 
Catholic schools, as well as to increasing numbers of 
blacks in previously all-white neighborhoods. For the 
most part Catholic St. Louisans, like the majority of the 
city, acted as passive liberals who accepted the reality 
of desegregated institutions due to Cardinal Ritter’s 
liberal activism, but were also unwilling to risk the 
respectability of their city to fight for segregated schools 
and neighborhoods. 
Even if a significant number of Catholics disliked 
Cardinal Ritter’s racial policies, most limited their 
complaints to friends and family. Dan Kelley, a West 
End resident who was ten years old at the time of the 
integration, explained that his parents were very upset with 
the Cardinal’s decision, though they, like most Catholics, 
did not engage in any protest against the decision. Kelley 
recalled, “people talked about it at church” and worried 
that “everything was going to go to hell in a hand basket.” 
In the end, though, he explained that while many disagreed 
with the decision, “they accommodated it.”21 This passive 
acceptance of Catholic school desegregation and the 
Cardinal’s liberal race policies opened an opportunity for 
Catholic leaders to be optimistic about the possibility of 
fostering interracial parishes. However, the ambivalent 
nature of the Catholic community’s commitment to 
integration ultimately did very little to sustain integration 
in the West End.
The most salient example of short-lived but direct 
opposition to Cardinal Ritter’s school integration was a 
Completed in 1909, Soldan High School originally 
educated a wealthy and predominantly Jewish student body 
until the 1950s.  It was named for Frank Louis Soldan, 
superintendent of St. Louis Public Schools who had died the 
previous year.  It is one of several in St. Louis designed by 
William B. Ittner, who designed schools in new ways starting 
in the early twentieth century with increased attention to the 
needs of students and new learning theory.  Today, it is the 
Soldan International Studies High School.
St. Elizabeth’s was an African-American Catholic Church 
in the 1940s; most of its parishioners sent their children to 
the segregated St. Joseph’s Colored High School.  In the 
undated first communion photo from St. Elizabeth’s, note 
the white nun on the left. (Images: Archdiocese of St. Louis 
Archives)
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group of over eight hundred Catholics who formed an 
organization to block Catholic school desegregation. 
The Catholic Parents Association of St. Louis and 
St. Louis County threatened to sue the Cardinal for 
forcing integration. Just weeks after its creation, the 
group reluctantly disbanded after Cardinal Ritter 
announced that anyone opposing the integration would 
be excommunicated. During the emotionally charged 
final meeting of the Catholic Parents Association, group 
leader John Barrett pleaded with the crowd to rescind its 
legal threats against the Cardinal and disband the group. 
On the verge of tears and “in a state of near collapse,” 
he announced, “the only alternative we can now have to 
disbanding this group is to turn on our Archbishop and 
our faith. I am not going to do that. We cannot scandalize 
our Catholic religion and oppose our Archbishop without 
getting into sin. The only way we could carry on after 
this, is to throw up our Catholic religion.”22 Barrett “wept 
openly” as he put forth a motion to disband the group. The 
motion was met with loud booing from the crowd, and 
one man even grabbed the microphone and shouted that 
Catholic parents should transfer their children to public 
schools in protest. Even though the meeting was emotional 
and chaotic, only fifty people voted against disbanding the 
group. After announcing that the motion to disband had 
passed, “Barrett was so overcome that he blindly left the 
platform and, hardly able to walk, [had to be] escorted to 
his car.”23 
Though several individuals voiced their continued 
dissatisfaction with Catholic school integration, the 
Catholic Parents Association was defunct. This event 
indicates two important points. First, when forced 
to choose, St. Louis Catholics who opposed school 
integration chose their religious views over their racial 
views. Second, and equally important, while these 
Catholics ceased fighting school integration, they did 
not have to accept an integrated community. As became 
apparent through housing choices, Catholics often moved 
out of parishes that were integrating. The short-lived 
existence of the Catholic Parents Association, while 
ultimately unsuccessful in their goal of blocking Catholic 
school integration, certainly demonstrated that many 
St. Louis Catholics were unwilling to support Cardinal 
Ritter’s liberal race policies.
While the Catholic Parents Association was the most 
vocal instance of opposition to integrated Catholic schools, 
some parents did indeed remove students from Catholic 
schools that enrolled black students. For example, the all-
girls Rosati-Kain High School, which drew a significant 
number of students from West End parishes, enrolled 
five black students for the 1947–1948 school year.24 As a 
result, “about thirty girls who had previously registered, 
on learning of the acceptance of five colored girls, sought 
entrance to other Catholic High Schools, and a few 
to Public High Schools.”25 In subsequent years, black 
enrollment increased to over one hundred pupils, about 20 
percent of the school population by 1954.26 While some 
parents chose to actively resist integration through school 
choice, the majority kept their children in Catholic schools. 
Even though most St. Louis Catholics were willing to 
tolerate desegregated religious education, the same could 
not be said for integrated neighborhoods. Archdiocese 
concerns and parish population patterns in the racially 
transitioning West End show clearly that the vast majority 
of white Catholics were unwilling to live in integrated 
city neighborhoods; by the late 1960s, St. Rose Parish in 
the West End only served about two hundred Catholics.27 
In a letter to parish priests, Cardinal Ritter specifically 
asked if priests would volunteer to be assigned to a racially 
transitioning parish, saying, “I realize this is an unusual 
request, but these are unusual times.”28 Clearly, leaders of 
Catholic institutions understood the necessity of making 
special efforts to foster stable, integrated neighborhoods 
that would be acceptable to both blacks and whites.
The history of the West End’s St. Rose of Lima Parish, 
established in 1884 and closed in 1992, shows how 
racial demographics affected Catholics in this north city 
neighborhood. The parish flourished in the first half of the 
twentieth century. It shifted from a small rural community 
outside the city limits to serving an increasingly urban 
population, boasting a handsome building dedicated in 
Not all Catholics supported Ritter’s efforts to end segregation 
in parochial schools, as this handbill from 1947 suggests. 
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)
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1910, a variety of church clubs, and several Catholic 
institutions, including a maternity hospital and a girls’ 
technical school. The parish also ran St. Rose of Lima 
School, with an enrollment of over four hundred students.29 
In recounting the history of St. Rose of Lima from 
1934–1984, the parish history explains: “To tell the story 
of St. Rose Parish… is to tell the story of a neighborhood 
because Catholic parishes are based in neighborhoods. …
[I]n many parishes the people who celebrate the centennial 
are grandchildren of the men and women who celebrated 
the golden jubilee. At St. Rose’s, however, that is not 
the case. There are . . . few such people tied to those 
earlier ones.”30 The history chronicles the racial transition 
of the West End parish. As a small number of black 
Catholics moved into the West End, they experienced a 
moderate degree of discrimination, but the St. Rose of 
Lima Parish history asserts that many white parishioners 
were welcoming. St. Rose School activities were open 
to students regardless of race. One parishioner, Mrs. 
Anson, “took it as her personal ministry to welcome Black 
women and make them part of any activity.”31 The first 
years of integration, both according to the parish history 
as well as St. Rose student Dan Kelley, passed relatively 
uneventfully. Kelley remembers that African American 
students started attending St. Rose Parish elementary 
school without incident in the late forties, saying “they just 
started to show up, and it just wasn’t a big issue.”32 The 
parish history says that racial transition increased sharply 
as federal urban renewal projects demolished hundreds 
of residences in traditionally black neighborhoods. Many 
of these new West End residents rented apartments from 
large, subdivided houses in the neighborhood. St. Rose’s 
Father Clohessy made some efforts to convert blacks, but 
his proselytizing produced few converts. By 1962, only 14 
of St. Rose School’s 450 children were white, and many of 
the new black students were not Catholic.33 
Even though the official history of St. Rose highlights 
the positive aspects of the parish’s racial history, the 
account also reveals white Catholics’ struggles to reconcile 
the church’s call to integrate and personal discomfort 
with racial mixing. Even Father Clohssey demonstrated 
ambivalence in the face of the changing character of the 
parish. The history explains that he was “uncomfortable 
with all the changes” occurring in the parish in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.34 The history repeatedly mentions 
parishioners’ worries about the neighborhood’s racial 
change, heavily implying that an influx of blacks was a 
main reason whites were moving out of the neighborhood. 
Despite the commitment of Catholic institutions and some 
parishioners to integrated neighborhoods and schools, 
in the space of about ten years, the West End’s Catholic 
and non-Catholic population shifted from all-white to 
temporarily integrated to almost exclusively black.
By 1963, St. Rose’s new pastor understood he was 
the leader of a black parish, so in 1964, St. Rose hosted 
a meeting of priests to “study the problems of a Black 
parish.”35 St. Rose Parish, though, could not maintain a 
sustainable number of black parishioners; by 1967, the 
parish only had about two hundred members.36 In 1992, 
St. Rose and five other north city parishes combined due 
to low population. Despite Cardinal Ritter’s commitment 
to integrated education, by the 1960s parishes in the West 
End were focused on maintaining black, not interracial, 
parishes. The history of St. Rose Parish reveals that 
attempts in the fifties to foster an interracial parish as 
well as an integrated neighborhood were ultimately 
unsuccessful. As was typical for St. Louis race relations, 
parishioners limited overt opposition to Cardinal Ritter’s 
desegregation, but their residential patterns simultaneously 
shifted to sustain segregated living patterns. Liberal 
church leaders were unable to use their moral authority 
to overcome parishioners’ deep-seated fears—racial, 
economic, and social—of living among blacks. Because 
most St. Louis Catholics were committed to their faith, 
not to actively pursuing racial equality, church leadership 
could not compel Catholic residents to continue living in 
the area and welcome blacks into their neighborhood.
Jews also migrated out of the city in the decades 
following World War II—and they often did so earlier than 
Catholics—but their reasoning diverged in important ways. 
Unlike Catholic parishes that are geographically bounded, 
synagogues are free to uproot and move in response to 
population shifts. As a result, most Jewish institutions in 
St. Louis actively sought to move locations in anticipation 
of population shifts, and almost every West End Jewish 
congregation moved outside the city limits by the 1960s. 
Some Jews, often affiliated with Jewish organizations, tried 
to maintain their neighborhoods and convince other whites 
to remain. They allied with civil rights organizations and 
created community groups to address the challenges of 
stabilizing neighborhoods undergoing racial transition. 
Despite their efforts, though, these actively liberal Jews 
could not stem the flow of their peers into the county, 
and by about 1960 the neighborhood that had once been 
the center of the St. Louis Jewish community was almost 
exclusively black.
While St. Louis’s Jewish community has always been 
small in comparison with the total population (about 6 
On May 4, 1949, students at Washington University in St. 
Louis held a rally to gain admission for African-Americans 
at the university. (Image: Washington University Special 
Collections)
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percent of the city’s population in the early 1900s), Jews 
still profoundly influenced the city and the West End 
neighborhood in particular. Historian Walter Ehrlich 
chronicles St. Louis’s Jewish population in his two-volume 
work, Zion in the Valley. The first documentation of Jews 
in the city dates to the early 1800s, and a handful of Jewish 
institutions arose throughout the mid-1800s. Increased 
Jewish immigration from Europe to St. Louis mirrored 
national immigration patterns of the turn of the twentieth 
century. By 1900, the majority of St. Louis Jews had 
settled in the “Ghetto,” located north of downtown and 
west to Ninth Street. As the population grew, the city’s 
Jewish area expanded west toward Jefferson Avenue.37 
While most Jews were concentrated in this space, the area 
was also home to a variety of working-class newcomers, 
including blacks migrating from the South as well as 
Irish, Italian, and Polish immigrants, many of whom were 
Catholic.38 By the 1920s, the upwardly mobile Jewish 
population had shifted further west from the Mississippi 
River, settling in the West End, and most synagogues 
transferred to new West End locations to better serve 
their congregants. For the next thirty years, the Jewish 
community flourished in the West End. 
A variety of West End institutions served the Jewish 
population. As most Jewish children attended public 
schools, Soldan High School became a source of pride 
for the Jewish community and hosted liberal interfaith 
and interracial events. For example, in 1941 the school 
held a Youth and Democracy Rally, which Catholics, 
Protestants, Jews, blacks, and whites attended.39 While 
Jews were never the majority religion in either the West 
End or at Soldan, the school still offered a full program 
of Jewish classes, as well as an active Hebrew Club.40 
Jewish Soldan graduates of the 1940s discuss their alma 
mater very fondly. Anabelle Chapel remembered, “Soldan 
I really loved. Those were some of the finest days of my 
youth. It was a very good school.”41 Similarly, Harvey 
Brown, who graduated from Soldan in 1944, recalled that 
“Soldan was a great city school.”42 Several alumni who 
graduated in the 1940s particularly remember the school’s 
outstanding English department. From both a social and 
academic perspective, Soldan graduates from the 1940s 
In the 1940s, Soldan High School included a sizable Jewish population integrated into the student body, such as this group 
at the 1949 graduation party. (Image: St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)
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were extremely complimentary of their school. 
In addition to over a dozen houses of worship, the 
Young Men’s/Women’s Hebrew Association (YMHA) 
was another important institution for the West End Jewish 
community. Established in the late 1800s as a men’s 
literary club, the organization expanded in the first half of 
the twentieth century to become one of the most important 
Jewish community institutions in the city. The YMHA 
bounced from location to location in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century. Under the leadership of executive 
director Gilbert Harris, the YMHA purchased land to 
construct a Jewish community center that opened in 1927 
on the corner of Union and Enright, about two blocks 
from Soldan and in the heart of the West End. For three 
decades, this location provided a wide range of services 
to both Jewish and non-Jewish community members. The 
YMHA’s newsletter boasted about expanded facilities and 
opportunities available to members, including a library, 
game room, auditorium, swimming pool, handball courts, 
gym, billiard hall, and roof garden.43 Among various 
athletic teams, social clubs, and educational programs, 
the YMHA’s Liberal Forums stood out as a highlight of 
On May 4, 1949, students at Washington University in St. 
Louis held a rally to gain admission for African-Americans 
at the university. (Image: Washington University Special 
Collections)
A native St. Louisan, Gilbert Harris (seated second from left) 
returned to the city in 1922 to become executive director 
of the YMHA/YWMA in St. Louis after working for the 
National Jewish Welfare Board in New York.  The YMHA/
YWHA building at Union and Enright, built in 1927, was 
among his fundraising accomplishments. (Image: Gilbert 
Harris Collection, St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)
The Young Men’s Hebrew Association (YMHA) was a 
key part of the Jewish cultural life by the 1940s.  The first 
YMHA was founded in Baltimore in 1854 to assist Jewish 
immigrants; a branch opened in St. Louis in 1880.  An 
affiliated arm of it, the Young Women’s Hebrew Association 
(YWHA), was founded in 1888 in New York; the first 
independent YWHA chapter appeared in 1902.  Later 
in the twentieth century, they evolved into today’s Jewish 
Community Center (JCC), offering an array of activities and 
classes, as this catalogue from 1947–1948 suggests.  The 
YMHA/YWHA was at Union and Enright in the West End 
when the cover photo was taken. (Image: St. Louis Jewish 
Community Archives)
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YMHA activities. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the 
Liberal Forum sponsored talks by prominent figures, 
including Eleanor Roosevelt, Clarence Darrow, and Walter 
White.44 YMHA regulars remember Harris’s prominent 
presence at the YMHA. Hans Mayer, who moved to St. 
Louis as a child, explained that Harris was a “highly 
visible” director who always made sure to be present when 
children left for and returned from summer camp.45  
Soldan High School’s experience with school 
desegregation demonstrated the limited extent of what 
the West End’s Jewish and secular passive liberalism 
could achieve. Even though Catholic schools integrated 
in 1947, it was not until the 1954 Brown v. Board decision 
that public schools in St. Louis adopted a desegregation 
plan. Because by this time the city’s Catholic schools had 
desegregated, the passive liberal majority understood the 
inevitability of desegregation and therefore supported 
its implementation. Again, unlike in communities across 
the South, St. Louis’s integration plan was carried out on 
time and with little controversy. Some St. Louis schools, 
especially those in mostly white south city, would not 
experience a significant influx of black students in the 
early years of desegregated education. The heavily Jewish 
Soldan High School, on the other hand, absorbed more 
blacks than any other high school in the city.46 All accounts 
of integration at Soldan in 1955 indicate overwhelming 
success in both planning and implementation. In 
anticipation of the integration, Soldan held a meeting at 
which parents could ask questions and make suggestions 
about easing the transition, and there is no record of 
dissent at this meeting.47 Soldan’s new principal, Stanley 
Hill, connected the process of integration to the reputation 
of the West End, stating that “the good name of the 
neighborhood as well as the city was at stake in avoiding 
incidents such as those in Baltimore and Washington.”48 
To prepare for the new students, transferees met with 
faculty advisors and registered for classes the week before 
integration took place. The first integrated meeting of 
the Soldan-Blewett Parents’ Association had about two 
hundred attendees, many of whom were black.49 
On February 1, 1955, the day St. Louis high schools 
integrated, Soldan absorbed 375 black students, increasing 
the school’s enrollment to 1,350. Speaking three days after 
integration occurred in city high schools, Superintendent 
Hickey announced, “I cannot speak highly enough of the 
manner in which our high school boys and girls of both 
races have accepted this step. . . . [T]he striking thing to 
me is the positive, rather passive, acceptance of the change 
by the student groups.”50 The black press’s evaluation of 
Soldan’s integration was very similar to that of other city 
newspapers, explaining, “observation of passing in the 
corridors and classroom sessions gave no indication that 
anything out of the ordinary had occurred.”51 Soldan’s 
students took pride in the orderly and civilized manner of 
their school’s integration. In both 1955 and 1956, students 
dedicated their yearbook to their school administrators and 
commended the manner in which integration occurred. The 
yearbook editors claimed, “[T]his new administration has 
handled the job of integration with skill and intelligence 
and has made Soldan-Blewett the best integrated school in 
St. Louis.”52 An analysis of yearbook photographs reveals 
that black students participated actively in Soldan’s clubs 
and sports.53
Jake Leventhal and Linda Kraus, two Jewish students 
who attended Soldan when it desegregated, have similar 
memories of the first year of integration. Neither has 
recollections of race-based incidents, and Leventhal called 
the integration process “seamless.” Kraus continued her 
participation in integrated extra-curricular activities, 
including the yearbook, newspaper, and cheerleading, and 
she believed that the integration went as well as it could. 
Neither remembers the school explicitly preparing students 
for the integration, other than assigning students to new 
advisors to make sure that each class had a mix of black 
and white students. As an athlete, Leventhal remembers 
Vice Principal Otto Rost visiting his integrated football 
team during a summer practice and specifically instructing 
the players to “be mixed up” racially the next time he 
came to check on them. Leventhal discussed his time at 
the integrated Soldan fondly, explaining that the school’s 
athletic teams served as a role model for interracial 
cooperation for the entire school.54
Ha Ivria was the Hebrew Cultural Center at Soldan High 
School.  When this picture for the Soldan yearbook 
appeared, Ha Ivria had some 40 members. (Image: St. Louis 
Jewish Community Archives)
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By all accounts the integration had been implemented 
successfully, as evidenced by an almost complete lack of 
controversy, as well as outward community enthusiasm. 
The initial success of Soldan’s integration was due to 
passive liberalism: West End residents understood that 
segregated education was no longer socially acceptable, so 
the community rallied behind a smooth school integration 
in the wake of Brown. The amount of public support given 
to the desegregation process made St. Louisans optimistic 
that their racial liberalism would foster a progressive and 
democratic city. Citizens believed that St. Louis was in 
a prime position to handle interracial urban education 
without violence or controversy, and the confident tone of 
the black press was similar to that of other newspapers. 
In an article published a few days after the high schools’ 
integration, an Argus article asserted, “[T]he cooperation 
of all concerned up to this point is assurance enough 
that St. Louis is foremost among American cities willing 
to advance democracy in deeds.”55 A large and widely 
publicized segment of the city welcomed integrated 
schooling due to liberalism’s commitment to racial 
equality. 
It took only a few years, however, for attentive citizens 
to realize how fleeting this success was, and when faced 
with the reality that integration might require difficult 
personal decisions about where to live and educate 
their children, passive liberals turned their backs on 
integration. In a 1959 statement to the Urban League 
Board of Directors, St. Louis branch executive director 
Leo Bohanon proclaimed, “[A]bout two years ago the first 
complaints alleging a breakdown in school desegregation 
came to the attention of the Urban League. Charges were 
made that the school administration was permitting Clark 
grade and Soldan High schools to become all Negro 
schools in pupils and teachers.” He goes on to state,  
“[T]here is a growing feeling that both the public school 
administration and the Board of Education have adopted 
a laissez faire attitude toward public school integration, 
which borders on indifference” [strikethrough original].56 
He also provided a list of accusations, which included 
busing white students to white schools and overcrowding 
at predominantly black schools. Clearly, the Urban League 
and other civil rights organizations believed passivity and 
indifference were unacceptable.
Further, African American City Alderman William 
Lacy Clay (who would later represent St. Louis in the 
United States House of Representatives) charged that 
“the St. Louis Board of Education and the Department of 
Instruction have been guilty of either a premeditated and 
intentional program to cause and allow the increase of 
segregation in the schools or at the very least have adopted 
policies that have been conducive to the re-segregation of 
the school system.”57 He noted that Soldan was 99 percent 
black, while the neighborhood was 50 percent white; this 
meant that 1,700 white students who should have been 
attending Soldan were being educated in white public 
schools.58 Jake Leventhal explained that one year after he 
graduated from Soldan, his parents moved out of the city 
despite the financial hardship this imposed because his 
sister had been the only white student in her elementary 
school class.59
To understand why and how St. Louis school integration 
failed, it is necessary to analyze conversations surrounding 
residential choices. West End residents, both those merely 
looking for an attractive place to live as well as individuals 
who touted themselves as racially liberal, were ultimately 
unwilling to collectively invest in the continued integration 
and middle-class status of the West End. By analyzing 
housing choices and changes in Jewish institutions’ 
locations, the limits of St. Louis’s passive and active 
liberalism become apparent. Despite the fact that city 
residents were mostly in agreement regarding the need to 
end formal segregation, citizens were largely unwilling to 
sustain this commitment to desegregation through housing 
choices.
While Gilbert Harris was proud of the ways the 
YMHA building on Union Boulevard served the West 
End community, Harris’s goal, like those of the West 
End’s synagogues, was for Jewish institutions to follow 
Ritter issued this statement to support the announced 
desegregation of St. Louis Public Schools in the aftermath 
of the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954.  
Ritter instructed that “This letter to be read at all Masses on 
Sunday, June 27, 1954.” (Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis 
Archives)
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Jewish population trends, not to shape them. The YMHA’s 
commitment to following Jewish population patterns led 
to complex and contradictory statements and policies 
regarding Jews’ residential choices and their role in 
fostering integrated neighborhoods. As it became apparent 
by the late forties that Jews were increasingly choosing 
to live west of the city limits, by 1950 Harris advocated 
heavily for the YMHA to move out of the city, despite the 
fact that a significant number of Jews remained in the West 
End into the mid-1950s. Therefore, Jewish institutions’ 
movement out of the city cannot simply be attributed 
to attractions of suburban living; predictions of future 
population trends were based on racialized assumptions 
that upwardly mobile Jews would not live among blacks.
A 1947 YMHA program needs survey provides insight 
into both the state of the West End neighborhood and the 
Jewish community’s future in it, and its recommendations 
reveal deep problems with passive liberalism. In 1947, 
the survey stated, about one-half of St. Louis’s Jewish 
population resided outside city limits, with a high 
concentration in University City, a municipality directly 
bordering the West End. With this information, the authors 
believed that the city’s Jewish population would soon be 
concentrated west of the city limits. Taking this impending 
population shift into account, the report predicted that the 
Union Boulevard YMHA building would only continue 
to be an adequate location for another ten to fifteen years, 
as long as satellite programs were created to reach Jews 
outside the city. 
While this report provided a large amount of 
demographic information about the region’s Jewish 
population, its references to neighboring black populations 
provide a fascinating window into Jews’ feelings about 
the possibility of integrated neighborhoods. Published 
before the Shelley v. Kraemer decision, this report 
indicates that Jewish institutional leaders assumed blacks 
would eventually move into the West End. Even before 
the demise of racially restrictive housing covenants, the 
report correctly predicted that blacks would soon reside 
in areas of the West End that were primarily comprised 
of rental properties. Though the report does not explicitly 
label this impending trend as negative, the writers were 
uneasy about the effects blacks would have in the West 
End. The fact that blacks were the only non-Jewish group 
referenced in the report indicates that the authors drew 
a direct connection between migration of blacks into 
the West End and the neighborhood’s decline in Jewish 
population. This connection was a thinly veiled admission 
that, regardless of widespread support for the ideal of 
integration, the authors assumed most Jews did not want 
to live in a racially integrated neighborhood. The report 
stated that when blacks began to move into the West 
End, “Union Avenue from Delmar to Page will probably 
remain a [Jewish] civic center area for a period of about 15 
years.”60 The report had racial overtones without making 
any explicit race-based recommendations. When blacks, 
as predicted, did begin migrating into the West End, the 
YMHA’s, as well as the Jewish community’s, responses 
were simultaneously welcoming and wary. Some Jews 
actively welcomed the transitioning neighborhood’s 
interracial character, and the YMHA provided a number of 
interracial programs, indicating the institution’s acceptance 
of blacks in the neighborhood. However, even as Jews 
accepted the concept of integration, most did not believe 
it was their personal responsibility to foster integration 
through housing choices.
YMHA Executive Director Gilbert Harris’s statements 
regarding neighborhood racial transition were dizzyingly 
contradictory, and these inconsistencies demonstrated the 
genuine ambivalence he and many other passively liberal 
residents likely felt regarding how to interpret changes in 
the West End and Jewish institutions’ role in shaping those 
changes. “Our Neighborhood,” a speech Harris delivered 
seven years after the program needs survey recommended 
moving the YMHA to the suburbs, clearly illustrated his 
confusion. In one section of the speech, he stated:
The [West End] which once was an area of home 
owners . . . is now characterized as a neighborhood 
of transients and lower economic groups. I make this 
statement objectively and without any lament for 
the good old days. Every American city and every 
American neighborhood seems to go through its 
years of youth, maturity and decline. . . . Today there 
are some communities that are concerned with the 
conservation process of neighborhoods and are doing 
something about it, and hopefully in the future more 
neighborhoods will continue to be zealous to maintain 
their character. In giving these facts I do not speak 
disparagingly of any people. All peoples need housing 
and we know that as their economic status improves, 
their social acceptability advances too.61
Several key paradoxes were present in Harris’s thinking, 
and these complexities reveal the limitations of passive 
liberals’ thought and action on race issues. First, Harris 
simultaneously identified with the West End but also 
showed willingness to abandon the neighborhood for the 
sake of economic opportunity in the suburbs. Second, he 
provided only lukewarm evaluations of efforts to conserve 
the character of transitioning neighborhoods, despite the 
fact that the YMHA sometimes served as a meeting place 
for the religious and secular organizations that championed 
integration. Third, he portrayed neighborhood change as 
inevitable, again, despite the fact that the YMHA hosted 
organizations firmly committed to halting neighborhood 
deterioration through maintenance of integration. Harris 
seemed in favor of neighborhood conservation efforts 
in theory, but as a Jewish community leader, he was 
unwilling to participate in them actively or to make the 
YMHA building a symbol of Jewish commitment to West 
End neighborhood integration.
Later in this same speech, he made the following 
comments:
Those of us who live in our neighborhood like it 
and want to improve it in whatever way we can. 
Unfortunately, there are not enough people who are 
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energetic enough to do the job. . . . They were full of 
venom about having to leave the neighborhood and to 
suffer financial losses in selling their homes, and were 
very cynical about the newcomers. … As one who has 
lived most of his life in the general neighborhood, and 
who looks forward to many more years there, I am 
anxious to see the neighborhood maintain itself. It has 
many advantages—cultural, spiritual, and geographic. 
I know there are those who share the same point 
of view and with their help we hope that our 
neighborhood will continue to be a fine and interesting 
place in which to live.62
Here again, Harris’ contradictions were glaring. He 
concurrently assumed that whites would abandon the 
neighborhood, expressed whites’ anger at the declining 
status of the neighborhood, and also stated that he intended 
to continue living in the West End. The very belief that 
property values would fall simply due to blacks’ presence 
in a neighborhood shows whites’ racial fears. Because the 
fear of declined economic status was tied to integrated 
neighborhoods, financial interest easily trumped passive 
liberal ideology. While it is unclear whether Harris was 
conscious of all these contradictions, their presence in a 
public speech indicated that Harris himself wrestled with 
his understanding of changes in the West End. There were 
certainly racist qualities to his statements, yet his ideas do 
not seem hateful. Rather, he was demonstrating a genuine 
attempt to process the rapid societal changes occurring 
around him, attempts that West End residents were likely 
also grappling with.
In a speech a few months later, Harris made 
a fascinating comment about the importance of 
neighborhood institutions, saying, “institutions uphold 
property values. Would Union Boulevard have remained 
the street it is today, with the various institutions 
located in that area, or would it have held up better with 
residences?”63 He attributed the West End’s success to 
the existence of institutions (religious as well as secular), 
yet he advocated for pulling the YMHA out of the West 
End for the sake of Jewish progress in the suburbs.64 The 
decision to move the YMHA into West County mirrored 
the decisions of synagogues. Congregation B’Nai 
Amoona, for example, began searching for a new location 
almost immediately after purchasing a property in the 
West End.65 For Harris, like most liberal Jews, opportunity 
for economic upward mobility in the suburbs or fears of 
declining financially trumped opportunities to maintain 
the status of a cherished neighborhood. If Gilbert Harris 
was an accurate representation of liberal Jews’ conflicted 
feelings on integration and neighborhood change, it is no 
surprise that efforts to maintain neighborhood integration 
failed miserably. Liberal individuals were unable to see the 
racist assumptions underlying the belief that integration 
would necessarily lead to decreased property values, so 
St. Louisans’ liberal ideology could not be a vehicle for 
realizing integration in the West End.
Even though some St. Louis Jewish leaders were in 
the vanguard of advocating for integrated schools and 
neighborhoods, their active liberalism could not convince 
passively liberal counterparts to remain in an integrating 
community. These actively liberal Jews, like counterparts 
in other cities, believed their decisions on where to live 
and educate their children could play a role in creating 
stable, desirable, and integrated urban neighborhoods. To 
achieve a desirable integrated neighborhood, community 
activists would have to work against ambivalence 
regarding individuals’ personal roles in maintaining the 
integrated, middle-class character of the West End. It 
would only be possible to sustain integration through 
explicit claims that the West End could maintain its 
desirable character, convincing white residents they should 
not sell their properties.
During the brief time that St. Louis’s public school 
desegregation generally and Soldan’s integration 
specifically seemed to be working as planned, religious 
and secular organizations committed themselves to making 
the West End a model of a successful, integrated, and 
stable middle-class neighborhood. The Jewish Community 
Relations Council (JCRC) was in the vanguard of 
these efforts. Through the leadership of St. Louis 
branch Executive Director Myron Schwartz, the JCRC 
provided active leadership in a variety of neighborhood 
improvement efforts and collaborated frequently with 
the Urban League as well as various neighborhood-
based organizations. Schwartz corresponded frequently 
with other cities’ JCRC leaders to understand how other 
city neighborhoods were dealing with neighborhood 
racial transition. JCRC leaders across the urban North 
understood neighborhood change as a democratic issue. 
A draft of a JCRC guide for changing neighborhoods 
explained, “[T]he contradictions between our democratic 
principles and our actual practices cannot help but arouse 
suspicion, cynicism and distrust, both among our own 
citizens and our watchful allies.”66 Clearly, a cohort of 
Jewish leaders understood that vocalizing integrationist 
rhetoric amidst a mass exodus into the suburbs would 
not promote racial equality. Maintaining integrated 
neighborhoods would require active decisions by Jews 
to remain rooted in urban neighborhoods in the face of 
speculation and panic.
However, as historian Lila Berman has indicated 
and the St. Louis experience demonstrated, most urban 
Jews were unwilling to base housing decisions on the 
possibility of maintaining integration. Even the national 
JCRC report’s recommendations did not include calls to 
sustain residences in transitioning neighborhoods; instead, 
it suggested what Berman termed “remote urbanism”: 
population studies, education, and political activism to 
increase access to non-discriminatory housing, allowing 
Jews to devote charitable funds to urban areas while 
simultaneously moving out of them.67 Remote urbanism, 
though, was an acceptance of passive liberalism, because it 
allowed people to believe they could support urban issues 
while concurrently disinvesting in cities by moving to the 
suburbs. The JCRC report therefore fell into the trap it 
cautioned leaders to avoid: the report wanted to support 
urban neighborhoods through rhetoric and charity, but it 
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did not call for Jews to make their housing choices based 
on an ideal of integrated communities. Most passive liberal 
Jews believed they could further racial equality verbally 
and politically while making personal choices to move into 
racially homogenous suburbs. Myron Schwartz, the St. 
Louis JCRC branch, and other neighborhood organizations 
attempted a more active role in maintaining integrated 
living space through alliances with local organizations, 
but these efforts proved unsustainable because most white 
West End residents were unwilling to let a desire for 
neighborhood integration dictate personal choices of where 
to live. Therefore, many attempts to be actively liberal 
quickly became passive, as Jewish organizations were 
largely unwilling to ask Jews to make housing choices 
based on a commitment to racial equality. 
Starting in 1953, two interracial and actively liberal 
West End organizations, first the Union Boulevard 
Association (UBA) and later the West End Community 
Conference (WECC), attempted to craft a stable, middle-
class, desirable, and integrated neighborhood. Their efforts 
and shortcomings demonstrate difficulties active liberals 
confronted in the face of a passively liberal majority. That 
year, the UBA conducted a small survey of thirty-seven 
West End residents to understand how people perceived 
changes within the neighborhood. Many white respondents 
believed that they lived in an ideal location, but they also 
cited racially coded reasons for wanting to move out, 
including “crowding, dirt, [and] noise,” as well as some 
explicit discomfort with proximity to blacks.68
The most creative UBA campaign involved decreasing 
blight in the blocks surrounding Soldan High School. 
To stabilize areas of the neighborhood that were 
deteriorating and maintain property values, a group of 
residents requested urban renewal funding from the 
city government to study zoning violations and build 
parks and playgrounds. The press lauded these efforts, 
claiming, “Residents of the Soldan-Blewett High School 
neighborhood set a fine example with their proposal 
to organize a conservation and improvement program 
before it is too late. . . . Here is planning at its best—city 
planning with a strong base of neighborhood interest and 
initiative.”69 In order to receive federal funding, West End 
residents had to request that areas of their neighborhood 
be labeled “blighted,” so that they would be eligible for 
urban renewal money. Though federal urban renewal 
programs—both nationally and in St. Louis—were largely 
vilified by the mid-1960s because they were often used 
to fund entrepreneurs’ interests over those of residents, 
this instance of West End community members requesting 
funding shows that in urban renewal’s early stages, St. 
Louis residents were sometimes able to have an impact on 
where and how federal funding was spent. Despite these 
innovative, citizen-led efforts, the UBA had little lasting 
impact on the West End. In fact, labeling sections of the 
West End as blighted may have backfired because many 
residents likely felt uneasy about living in spaces marked 
as deteriorating. The UBA’s experimentation showed that 
some West End residents were willing to work creatively 
to maintain the status of their neighborhood.
While the UBA clearly wanted to improve the 
neighborhood, it was the West End Community 
Conference that more directly attempted to stave off white 
flight. Formed in 1955, the WECC’s explicit goal was to 
keep the West End a high quality, integrated neighborhood. 
A flier advertising an April 1955 meeting explained,  
“[M]any of us feel that this is a good neighborhood to live 
in and want to see it preserved and improved. That’s why 
over a hundred of us met recently to found . . . The West 
End Community Conference.”70 By 1957, the WECC, 
which served a 150-block area that was home to 25,000 
residents, boasted 800 members. A 1957 St. Louis Post-
Dispatch article detailing WECC work explained that the 
its strategy for maintaining integration revolved around 
stabilizing real estate prices by maintaining physical 
neighborhood space and convincing residents to remain in 
the neighborhood. The article attributed WECC successes 
to the presence of liberal residents, claiming that “a vital 
factor . . . was the presence in the area of an extraordinary 
number of people of broadly liberal bent, accustomed 
to leadership, unafraid of responsibility and fully aware 
of how much might depend on the example they set.”71 
West End resident Mrs. Carl Meyers typified this liberal 
commitment to remaining in the neighborhood. She 
explained, “[W]e deliberately chose to live here . . . we 
like it simply because it isn’t homogeneous. In our block 
there is a professor at Washington University, another 
man rich enough to have a chauffeur, and a laborer. 
We’re interested in people, and in finding the answer to 
the question: Can people really change things, or does 
nature take its course?”72 Clearly, a vocal, though probably 
small, group of actively liberal residents was willing to 
base their housing choices on maintaining an integrated 
neighborhood.
The WECC enjoyed a positive reputation for its first 
five years of existence. In reference to the WECC, a black 
newspaper article stated, “[H]ere is a particular section 
of a great city that has been justly held up as an example 
of what can be done under our American democracy.”73 
However, this idealistic view of the neighborhood was 
incredibly tenuous, and a scandal within WECC leadership 
illustrated the fragility of white racial liberalism in St. 
Louis. In 1960, the WECC suddenly lost its positive 
reputation as a liberal interracial organization due to an 
incident involving a board member. Landlord and WECC 
Vice-Chairman William Baggerman evicted a husband 
and wife from his building upon learning that they were 
an interracial couple. Baggerman claimed he evicted the 
couple because they had “acted in bad faith by concealing 
the fact of [the] wife’s race, [while] Negro members of the 
WECC said Baggerman’s actions were motivated by racial 
prejudice.”74 This incident exposed serious latent tensions 
within the organization and undermined the interracial 
harmony on which the WECC was predicated. In response 
to this controversy, the WECC board voted on whether 
to “pass judgment on William Baggerman’s behavior,” 
and it was the first time in WECC history that a vote was 
split down racial lines.75 Only one black woman voted 
with the conference’s white members, stating she wanted 
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to keep lines of communication open, while a single 
white member, a Washington University dean, voted with 
the conference’s African American leaders to condemn 
Baggerman’s actions.
WECC members’ reactions to this controversy reveal 
how quickly active liberal viewpoints cracked under 
pressure. One frustrated white member exclaimed,  
“[W]hy do you always want to rush things. You are trying 
to go too fast. If you would just slow down maybe we 
would work something out”; a black member responded, 
“[W]e are not that kind of organization. This should never 
have come up.”76 This interchange demonstrates a glaring 
miscommunication between white and black WECC 
members. White members embraced liberal race relations 
when they provided a noncontroversial way to deal with 
inevitable school and neighborhood integration that did not 
require personal or economic sacrifice. When tested by a 
controversy, though, white liberals retreated to passivity, 
preferring not to “rush things.” This dialogue shows that 
above all, white liberals in the West End, whether passive 
or active, wanted to avoid upheaval. Here lies the ultimate 
problem with liberalism in St. Louis: even if a number 
of actively liberal individuals were willing to make their 
housing choices based on a desire to foster an integrated 
neighborhood, they could not accept that the process of 
maintaining integration would sometimes be contentious 
and uncomfortable. If the most actively liberal white 
community members were asking blacks to “just slow 
down,” it is no wonder that integration efforts quickly 
faltered. 
Media response to this incident was strong, indicating 
how much stock community members had placed in the 
WECC, and they quickly highlighted the limits of white 
West Enders’ liberalism. One article explained that the 
incident may be “the real test of whether the West End 
Community Conference is a genuine democratic outgrowth 
in our American way, or is only a façade for pretentious 
half-believers.”77 The Argus, St. Louis’s black newspaper, 
echoed these questions of whites’ sincerity, stating that 
“the majority of the whites, we are sure, felt snug and 
secure in the feeling that ‘we are among the enlightened 
liberals of this day.’”78 To both black and white residents, 
this incident revealed the tenuous nature of interracial 
alliances in the West End, as well as the inability of 
liberalism to maintain commitments to integration amidst a 
contentious atmosphere. 
Although the controversy did not cause the WECC to 
disband, it was a crippling blow—a number of frustrated 
members (mostly black) resigned, and records of WECC 
activities after the scandal are infrequent. It is crucial to 
note how quick newspapers were to highlight whites’ 
wavering commitment to full integration and liberalism, 
in contrast to the notable lack of controversy in accounts 
of the 1955 public school desegregation. By 1960, then, 
both blacks and whites were skeptical of white liberal 
commitments to racial equality. If the WECC could be 
debilitated by one controversy, it is unsurprising that 
efforts to maintain the interracial demographics of the 
neighborhood failed. Because racial liberalism could 
so quickly unravel, it was only natural that West End 
residents who were not politically active would be 
unwilling to maintain integration through housing choices 
that came with economic and social status risks. The 
WECC controversy exemplified the fragility of St. Louis’s 
liberal commitment to an interracial society.
The West End’s current segregation and decreased 
economic status was largely due to the weaknesses of 
American liberalism. In St. Louis, as well as throughout 
the country, liberals were unable to sustain combining 
the ideals of racial equality and middle-class economic 
opportunity, and fleeting attempts to do so floundered 
at the first signs of interracial contention. The methods 
of the West End Community Conference demonstrated 
that active liberals knew how to simultaneously promote 
integration and middle class neighborhood status. 
However, the organization’s history showed West Enders’ 
inability to fully commit to these methods, because passive 
liberalism allowed people to espouse racially progressive 
rhetoric while making housing decisions based on racial 
fears. Fleeting successes like the smooth school integration 
could not convince white liberals that it was worth 
working through racial tension to create an integrated 
and economically upwardly mobile urban neighborhood. 
Instead, liberals used the excuse of pursuing economic 
opportunity to abandon commitments to racial equality 
and integration. Ultimately, white liberals in St. Louis 
believed that a future of integrated neighborhoods, while a 
commendable ideal, was not the best avenue to pursue the 
economic and social status they desired.
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W h e n
SLEEPY HOLLOW
C a m e  t o  S t .  L o u i s
Washington Irving (1783–
1859) wrote short stories, 
essays, and biographies 
throughout his life.  He and 
James Fenimore Cooper were 
the first American writers 
to gain acclaim in Europe.  
Irving’s interests compelled 
him to write about a wide 
array of topics including 
biographies of George 
Washington and Mohammad, 
the Moors, and fifteenth-
century Spain. (Image: Library 
of Congress)
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 Fine nut trees, 
peach trees, grape 
vines, catalpas 
&c. &c. about the 
house—look out 
over rich, level 
plain or prairie—




and spinning of 
insects—fertility 
of country—grove 
of walnuts in the 
rear of the house—
beehives—dove 
cote—canoe—
Genl arrives on 
horseback with 
dogs—guns.  His 


















a cadet of W.P. now 
in the army—aid 
de camp to Genl Atkinson.
 Dinner plentiful—good—hut rustic—fried chicken, 
bacon and grouse, roast beef, roasted potatoes, tomatoes, 
excellent cakes, bread, butter, & c.
 Gov. C. gives much excellent information concerning 
Indians.
 His slaves—set them free—one he placed at a ferry—
another on a farm, giving him land, horses, &c.—a third 
he gave a large wagon & team of 6 horses to ply between 
Nashville and Richmond. They all repented & wanted to 
come back.
 The waggoner was York, the hero of the Missouri 
expedition & adviser of the Indians.  He could not get 
up early enough in the mornng—his horses were ill 
kept—two died—the others grew poor. He sold them, 
was cheated—entered into service—fared ill. “Damn this 
freedom,” said York, “I have never had a happy day since 
I got it.” He determined to go back to his old master—set 
off for St. Louis, 
but was taken 
with cholera in 
Tennessee & 
died.  Some of the 
traders think they 
have met traces of 
York’s crowd, on 
the Missouri.
 Returned 
by another route 






every thing in 
abundance—pass 
by a circle of 
Indian mounds—
on one of them 
Genl Ashley has 
built his house 
so as to have the 
summit of it as a 




noise of the cue 
& and the billiard 




other in the street.
 Friday Sept 
14. Drive out 
with Judge Peck, 
Judge’s uncle, & 
our party to Fort Jefferson to see Black Hawk—ride thro 
open country—formerly forest—drive to Genl Atkinson’s 
quarters.
 Black Hawk. old man upwards of 70 with aquiline 
nose—finely formed heard—organs of benevolence—his 
two sons—oldest a fine-looking young man—his brother 
in law the prophet—the little Indian stables.  
 They are all chained arms & ankles with cannon, but are 
allowed to walk about escorted by soldier.
 Old French town nicknamed Vuide Poche—old French 
settlers retain their dress, manners &c.—cared little for 
two or three times a week to dance—very sober and 
temperate tho gay—kept aloof from Americans but begin 
to intermarry with them.
 Black Hawk—had a skin of a black hawk in his hand & 
fanned himself with the tail.
By the time Irving met William Clark (1770–1838), the former explorer had 
gained a certain amount of fame.  For a New Yorker like Irving, the presence 
of slaves was particularly striking.  It is clear from Irving’s account that Clark 
crafted his narrative about York in the context of his views about slaves and 
African-Americans. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
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Black Hawk (1767–1838) was a famous Sauk born in northwestern Illinois.  While the Sauk and Fox tribes had ceded their 
Illinois lands in an 1804 treaty, they were permitted to use the region until the United States government wanted the land.  
In the late 1820s, settlers began moving into the area, but Sauks under Black Hawk refused to evacuate the region.  After 
a confrontation in summer 1832 in which hundreds of Native Americans were killed at Bad Axe Creek, Black Hawk and 
several other Sauk and Fox leaders were captured and imprisoned at Jefferson Barracks.  After being transported to Fortress 
Monroe, Black Hawk returned and told fellow natives that it was futile to resist the Americans since they were so numerous.  
This image is from Thomas McKenney’s History of the Indian Tribes of North America.  (Image: Missouri History Museum)
1  Excerpt reprinted by permission of the University of Oklahoma Press.
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A B O U T  T H E  A U T H O R S
Daniel Gonzales earned his MA in Museum Studies from the University of Missouri-Saint 
Louis in the Spring of 2010 as the E. Desmond Lee Fellow. Following graduation he worked in 
museum education and exhibit development at the Missouri History Museum. In 2013, Daniel 
took on the position of Museum Curator with the St. Louis County Parks system.
Quinta Scott is the author of The Mississippi: A Visual Biography.  She is also the author of 
Along Route 66: The Architecture of America’s Highway, a great read-aloud guidebook of the old 
road. She is the photographer/author of Route 66: The Highway and Its People with Susan Croce 
Kelly, and of The Eads Bridge: Photographic Essay by Quinta Scott; Historical Appraisal by 
Howard S. Miller. She and her husband, Barrie, live in Waterloo, Illinois, close to the American 
Bottom and the great Mississippi River Bluffs.
Andrew M. Cooperman earned a BA in History and International Relations from McKendree 
College (now University) and an MA in History from the University of Toledo. He grew up 
in Cahokia, and has spent the last thirteen years either working or volunteering at the Cahokia 
Courthouse State Historic Sites Complex. He is the author of “Cahokia’s Territorial Post 
Office” (Journal of St. Clair County History, Vol. 33, 2004) and “Legal Landmarks” (St. Louis 
Magazine, February, 2012). He is currently working on a display panel recounting the history of 
slavery in Illinois for Cahokia’s Jarrot Mansion State Historic Site.
Sarah Siegel is a second-year history PhD student at Washington University in St. Louis. She 
studies mid-twentieth century urban history, with a focus on community activism. She holds a 
BA in History from Yale University and a MA in Secondary Education from the University of 
Missouri-St. Louis. Before beginning her graduate research, she was a social studies teacher at 
Soldan High School in St. Louis.
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